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Literature

Abstract: How Still the Riddle Lies
Robert Baker, Chair
Louise Economides
Phil Condon
The tradition of “nature writing” in the United States draws heavily on the literary
movements of Romanticism and Transcendentalism. Wordsworth’s meditative walks,
Keats’s nightingale, Thoreau’s pond—these concepts have shaped literary beliefs and
perceptions of natural landscapes as much as a writer’s individual haunts or favorite
creatures. In a contemporary context, a writer steps down a long, wellworn path when
he or she attempts to describe a bird taking flight or the way the sunlight feels at a certain
time of afternoon. In the nineteenth century, writers began looking to nature as a source
of redemption—through interaction and contemplation of natural landscapes or animals,
writers often constructed fantastic, extraordinary metaphors and expressions of individual
consciousness or feeling. These types of natural contemplations still serve as potential
artistic reservoirs for contemporary writers and artists; however, this reservoir emerges as
increasingly fraught under the lens of feminist criticism.
The Romantic construction of “sublimation,” a process by which a “subject” can
gain invaluable creative or spiritual knowledge through an interaction with an “other”
(often, a natural place or thing) requires an implicit separation of subject from object.
Feminists have latched on to the dualist makeup of Romanticism and have urged a critical
reevaluation of how we must read these writers from a present standpoint. Moreover,
within this reevaluation, feminist criticism focuses on how female writers in this period
and others handled this objectification of the other. In my thesis, I have utilized feminist
and ecofeminist criticism to examine how nineteenth century poet Emily Dickinson
confronted the Romantic sublime, specifically in relation to the natural world. Namely, I
believe that Dickinson’s relationship to the natural world is less objectifying than more
publicly dominant literary names of her time and that she remained less interested in
obtaining subjective sublimity than in expressing a conceptually particular, somewhat
strange, always fascinating relationship with her physical surroundings. Furthermore,
humor served as a primary tool for Dickinson to conduct subversive reactions against the
dominant Romantic paradigm concerning the natural world and also allowed her more
access to reactionary discursive tools.
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Introduction: Transcending Mere Custom
Few American poets have been examined as much for their daily existence as for
their poetry as Emily Dickinson, a woman who lived much of her life in seclusion from
peers, community, church, and even family. Theorists and critics of her immense body of
work have crafted many links between her poems and her seemingly strange reclusive
nature over the past century. For many decades following Dickinson’s death, the
criticism had a largely “private” focus, viewing the poet and her work through a narrow
lens of familial events and supposed love affairs. Yet much contemporary analysis
concentrates instead on fostering a wider critical perspective for Dickinson’s work.
Instead of reading the poems with an image of a whiteclad, wideeyed woman in mind,
contemporary critics now draw on cultural, national, and literary movements in the
nineteenth century to further conceptualize and understand her complex and original
projects.
In this thesis, I have chosen to examine the representation of natural landscapes
and animals throughout Dickinson’s oeuvre. Namely, I am interested in how Dickinson’s
depiction of nature accords or not with Romantic conceptions; I have explored how much
or how little Dickinson’s depictions reflect the Romantic tendency to conceive of nature
as a vital source for contemplation and sublimation. Throughout this examination I also
draw from contemporary theory—specifically, feminism, ecocriticism, and
ecofeminism—to draw conclusions regarding how and why Dickinson treats nature in her
poetry. Ultimately, though Dickinson’s project to an extent reflects Romanticism’s
formal renderings and presentation of nature, she tends to repeatedly rework the
Romantic model of the sublime in numerous ways. Her motivations behind these
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alterations seem fluid; yet in this thesis I argue that she holds the Romantic model up to
the light in order to expose its adherence to a patriarchal system and its resultant
limitations for female writers. Moreover, I believe the Romantic model remains
ultimately too Cartesian and dualistic for Dickinson and that this subjugation of nature
becomes a major point of contention in the work. Finally, I also claim that she solidifies
her exposé of Romanticism through comedy; in my opinion, humor functions as a crucial
tool of subversion throughout the texts.
The paper opens with an exploration of Dickinson’s religious tendencies,
including her decision not to join her community church in Amherst. Interestingly, as
pointed out by Karl Keller, Dickinson’s poetic endeavors truly commenced for the most
part around the time that she made the notable decision to stay out of formalist religion.
Her letters to friends and family members at this point in her life reveal an individual
saddened and troubled regarding her spiritual choice but they also tell of a strange, inner
confidence regarding spiritual matters. Throughout the first chapter, I highlight several
poems that include reference to the natural world as well as spirituality. Many of the
poems that propose different or unconventional modes of spirituality contain animal
metaphors or imagery; moreover, in addition to creating “new” spiritual relationships via
poetic devices, Dickinson also uses diverse humorous tropes in order to comment on the
traditional setup of religion and spirituality as they exist in her understanding.
The second chapter opens by exploring the literary movement, Romanticism, and
the poets who wrote and worked under its influence in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Romantic poets often exalted and celebrated animals and natural landscapes in
their works, and the “natural” emerged as a principal component of the Romantic
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“sublime,” a literary process by which poets utilized another place or person in order to
achieve figurative “transcendence” or reach full creative capacity during the writing of
the poem. Dickinson, although fully cognizant of the workings of the Romantic sublime,
was arguably troubled by its implicit dualist makeup and often wrote using a corrupted
or altered model of the sublime in order to rework it to serve her particular
representation or to mock or satirize its inherent objectifications.
In Chapter 3, I explore more thoroughly the idea that Dickinson used humor as a
means to expose the patriarchal tendencies of Romanticism and the sublime. More often
than not, her “funny” poems also include animals. I explore the different types of
humorous “masks” that Dickinson assumes in order to comment on the literary and
religious communities of her time, and argue that humor may have allowed her increased
theoretical “access” to animals and natural places than more “tragic” stylistic decisions.
Critic Jonathan Bate examines how tragedy somehow “raises” the human subjects in a
scene above the material reality of description and representation, while humor retains
human subjects within the bounds of physical reality. Moreover, I also relate
Dickinson’s humor to her refutation of the sublime and examine how several poems
exaggerate or satirize the sublime model in order, presumably, to release the model from
its powerful roots.
Finally, the final chapter and conclusion relate Dickinson’s representation of
natural space to ecofeminist criticism and claim that she refuses traditional representation
because she held a less dualistic understanding of the universe and how humans should
involve themselves within the universe. As a woman writer who lacked access to literal
and figurative maledominated spheres of influence, I believe Dickinson naturally likens
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the repression of women to the repression of nature as enacted by patriarchal and
capitalist systems. Because dominant models of thinking repeatedly “othered” women in
order to obtain increased physical or mental power, naturally an “othered” woman might
find allegiance with creatures and/or natural spaces that are also objectified and
“othered.” I examine several poems in which Dickinson exposes the danger and implicit
violence of the patriarchal sublime and, later, explore how particular poems rebuke
patriarchal models to the extent that they offer new modes of thinking and representing
the natural world. Notably, her particularly subversive texts, those that question animal
abuse or propose animalhuman “unions,” are also often humorous. Indeed, these funny
“tropes” allow Dickinson to create a highly particular and personal representative
relationship to animals and places. Ultimately, she creates a resonant, unique language of
her own with which to discuss and contemplate the natural world beyond patriarchal
influence—and when we read and understand her work in these new terms from a present
perspective, we understand her particularity anew, as a fresh, distinct consciousness: “So
much has been made of the sadness in those houses and of the supposed misery of
Dickinson herself, that it is really no small thing at all. Turning our eyes to Dickinson’s
comedy humanizes her, makes her that much more believable, palpable, and wise. It
expands her range, her significance, and her power” (Juhasz, Miller, and Smith 140).
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Chapter 1: Embodied Being
As I will argue, Dickinson’s relationship to landscapes and animals is more
complicated and complex than those relationships posited by other Romantic writers.
Therefore, it is crucial to consider how a more holistic approach to the natural world
accorded with her understanding of spirituality and mortality. Prevailing Christian
dogma would claim that a human being is “above” or different from nature; the presence
of the human soul gives a person access to an afterlife that is unavailable to other living
creatures on Earth. How would Dickinson have reacted to this elevation of the human
over every other living thing? When we place her poetic emphasis on physical
immediacy alongside the fact that she never officially experienced “conversion” or joined
her community church, where might we conjecture that her difficulties with the church
lay most strongly?
Emily Dickinson found American religion out. She found out its
exclusiveness—that what was organic and necessary to her life was
unacceptable, that in fact she was unacceptable. It had her without having
any place for her. Furthermore, it created a world within, without putting
much of anything within that world; it was barren beyond belief, without
the abundance that she found … her own senses expected of religion. …
And so she tended to reject creeds, ministers, and church in favor of
simple introspection and a more pleasant existence. (Keller 77)

I would venture that this “exclusiveness” that Dickinson abhorred, as cited by Keller,
includes the “occupational” tendency that men of the cloth and of letters might have
expressed towards the natural world. With the word “occupational,” I mean to conjure
the sentiment of Manifest Destiny and the idea of physically settling in places in order to
achieve human success or profit. For Dickinson, a mancentered or humancentered
conception of the universe became tenuous in her poetic interactions with animals and
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landscapes. Furthermore, it is telling that her writing took off in quantity and quality in
the same year as the New England religious revival:
By the time she began writing poetry in earnest—1858 and 1859—her
religious interests were more troubled and her life became thereafter a
coherent confusion of doubts and hopes. … Dickinson’s religious state—
and we find it to have been fairly consistent after the New England revival
of 1859, a happening coinciding with her first poetry—was that of
liminality. She got caught between institutions and free form. She found
herself outside limits—and enjoyed the trouble it caused within her.
(Keller 78)

Most likely, one motivation for Dickinson in writing was to explore and understand
prevailing theology as well as construct her own spirituality. And, indeed, those poems
that detail natural landscapes and animals frequently fall into a category of work that also
explores mortality and religion. While considering those poems that deal with nature as
well as spirituality, we should also bear in mind how the works adhere to or deviate from
Romantic conceptions of nature; moreover, a fascinating component for exploration
emerges as we recognize that Dickinson may be satirizing or poking fun at Romantic,
malecentered conceptions of nature and religion.
In many of her letters and poems, Dickinson calls herself a “pagan,” sometimes in
banter, sometimes in seriousness (Keller 79). Poem # 869, “Because the Bee may
blameless hum” explores a particular variation of “pagan worship” and involves a
metaphorical transmutation of a human speaker into an animal. The humor in this poem
is light, jesting, and spontaneous:
Because the Bee may blameless hum
For Thee a Bee I do become
List even unto me.
Because the Flowers unafraid
May lift a look on thine, a Maid
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alway a flower would be.
Nor Robins, Robins need not hide
When Thou upon their Crypts intrude
So Wings bestow on Me
Or Petals, or a Dower of Buzz
That Bee to ride, or Flower of Furze
I that way worship Thee.
(Johnson 414).
The poem begins by introducing a creature from the natural world—a bee, which hums
along blameless throughout its daily existence. The bee hums “blamelessly” in several
respects: in the speaker’s viewpoint, the bee is not a moral agent, that is, the decisions it
makes throughout the day as it eats and works cannot be judged in a moral sense; the bee
is blameless to itself, that is, it does not judge or feel selfloathing because of its actions;
or, finally, presumably because there is no agent placing blame on the bee for its
humming, it remains blameless. The speaker than metaphorically “changes” herself into
a bee for “Thee,” a word which presumably represents a deity or God. This change
allows the speaker to become blameless to others, to herself, and to God. In a sense, the
speaker has removed the “human” qualities of herself, or the qualities that make her most
vulnerable to blame. As a result of this transmutation, the poet can then continue
“humming” (or singing, or making poetry) without fearing reprimand from self, others, or
God. In the second stanza, the flowers, like the bees, are also unafraid to look at God—
they have no guilt or judgment to consider either. And the “Maid,” a feminine
individual, can in this construction find another way to experience God, if she assumes
the position of the guiltless flower.
In her identification with bees and flowers in this poem, Dickinson utilizes a
childlike or innocent voice in order to call attention to how knowledge becomes
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constructed within her culture. The tone, while light, veils the poet’s serious intent to
emphasize the difference between how animals and humans experience the natural world,
or, more interestingly, between how humans believe humans experience the world and
how humans believe animals experience the world: “The voice of ingenuousness is
clearly a performance, a character created before our eyes by a poet who plays upon the
contrast she establishes between the speaker and the culture that is called into question”
(Juhasz 32). In this case, Dickinson assumes a childlike voice (e.g., “Mother, if God does
not mind if the bee sings, why can’t I sing?” ) to question a cultural adage. The silliness
of the comparison and the lighthearted diction and tone allow the female poet a safe place
from which to question the guilt that humans may attach to singing, writing, and self
expression: “The voice of the little girl ... can sound like one thing and reveal something
else. It can sound innocent and reveal experience, as Blake, too, had understood” (Juhasz
34).
So why then is this speaker questioning or making contrast between human and
animal “guilt?” If the speaker is longing for closeness to God, to be absolved of human
subjectivities, why is she blaming or judging herself? The obvious hint exists in the first
line—the bee is allowed his “blameless” hum—his song and intonation are a part of
unadulterated nature, whereas the speaker’s hum (or song, or poem) is corrupted by how
humans conceive of these two things. The speaker may in fact be seeking a
transmutation not only to “reach God,” but also to reach Him without sacrificing her own
particular poetic voice and need to sing. For it is through song, and dance, and flight, that
this speaker wants to worship—“So Wings bestow on me / Or Petals, or a Dower of Buzz
/ That Bee to ride, or Flower of Furze / I that way worship Thee.” In this poetic
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construction, the bee, flower and robin have a more direct access to God via their
“voices” than the human speaker—and the human speaker sees value in the animal
characteristics and highlights them for their transcendent qualities. The speaker does not
want to hide from her God; she does not want to fear her God. In the surrounding
landscape of personal perspective, it is the animals and plants that she illustrates as
having the most admirable type of relationship to an otherworldly deity, and only by
becoming one of these “creatures” can the speaker achieve the same redemption and
fulfill a spiritual goal. Although the tone at first glance seems provincial and/or simple,
Dickinson’s innocent approach in this poem remains a deliberate and subversive
construction. “Because the Bee may Blameless Hum/For Thee a Bee do I Become”—
there is unadulterated confidence in these lines, joy in poetry’s ability to construct new
modes of thinking and being. There is effrontery contained here—either against a God,
or a patriarchal system, or both—as if the poet says, “if you are going to judge me for my
lines, then consider me a bee. Your reproach cannot touch me, now.” A strange response
to a world that would never accept her on equal footing with a male author—can we
consider her poetic triumphs also practical triumphs? I believe that the answer is yes—if
the poet truly changed her mode of thinking and actually considered herself animallike,
then the taunts and jabs of an audience would not have been able to touch her. She would
understand blame, and not attach it to her poems. “Positioned between the mind of the
poet and the culture she inhabits, the poem’s space is where she can challenge dominance
and hegemony. The space of the poem is not exactly safe—someone could, after all, read
it; but it is the best and only place Dickinson knows for taking the chance, for making a
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try. … the world of the poem, in its contiguous relation to the culture itself, is the space
where cultural codes are not only cast into doubt but rearranged” (Juhasz 27).
When Dickinson refused to join the church in Amherst, Massachusetts, in the
midnineteenth century, a world of exploration and roleplaying opened up for her; her
poetry then provided a space to enact her own conceptions of theology and the afterlife.
Yet she also referenced religion and the church more directly in many of her personal
letters throughout her life. Keller surmises that her religious angst began in earnest in the
late 1850’s; yet her letters evince a particular spiritual questioning as early as 1852. Most
notably, religion and church matters seem to have caused a major disagreement between
Emily Dickinson and her bosom friend and sisterinlaw, Susan Gilbert Dickinson, in the
early 1850’s. Yet before the disagreement took place, Dickinson wrote Susan an
impassioned celebration of their friendship utilizing religious language in a rather
unconventional manner. Dickinson presumably writes this letter on a Sunday morning,
when she is alone in the house because all other members of the family have departed to
church:
The people who love God are expecting to go to meeting; don’t you go,
Susie, not to their meeting, but come with me this morning to the church
within our hearts, where the bells are always ringing, and the preacher
whose name is Love—shall intercede there for us! They will all go but
me, to the usual meetinghouse, to hear the usual sermon the inclemency of
the storm so kindly detaining me. (Johnson Letters 79)

Dickinson’s language here seems purposely inflammatory because presumably if all who
love God are going to meeting, then Dickinson is not one who loves God. Yet she
repeats the word “Love” twice in this excerpt, which to my mind betrays some
impulsiveness in a letter that conveys itself like a conversation. If Dickinson
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metaphorically creates a “Preacher whose name is Love,” then consequently there is
some room for Love, and Preachers, and perhaps even God, in her altered conception of
what the Sabbath becomes when she remains isolated at home conducting letter writing:
“As I sit here Susie, alone with the winds and you, I have the old king feeling even more
than before, for I know not even the cracker man will invade this solitude, this sweet
Sabbath of our’s” (Johnson Letters 79). Dickinson enacts her own “meeting,” in this
case, a teteatete with Susan Gilbert. When she associates this meeting with the church
and calls this process of letterwriting and figurative meeting a “Sabbath,” she has
reformulated and recreated a conventional conception of a Sabbath Day. In this case,
Dickinson’s emphasis on inwardness parallels the way in which many Romantic writers
began to implicitly alter the context of religious worship. As outlined by writers from
Blake to Thoreau, spirituality grows and deepens through acts of creation in isolation:
“For the general tendency (in Romanticism) was, in diverse degrees and ways, to
naturalize the supernatural and to humanize the divine” (Abrams Supernaturalism 68).
Moreover, Dickinson’s particular solitary religious experience as detailed in this letter
also includes an unadulterated expression of female friendship and love. Away from the
confines of the patriarchal church, Dickinson seems to feel freer and more full (the phrase
that “old king feeling” becomes especially interesting in this context); the act of writing
satisfies her emotionally and physically in its figurative and literal performance.
Letter #173 (likely written in 1854 according to Johnson) is also addressed to
Susan Gilbert. The letter is notably less jovial and less expressive than earlier letters to
Susan; there are few enacted connections of friendship extended by Dickinson. Although
the tone is declarative and referential, the language still reflects an ephemeral quality in
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its strange metaphors and expressions of speech: “We differ often lately, and this must be
the last. … Sue—I have lived by this. It is the lingering emblem of the Heaven I once
dreamed, and though if this is taken, I shall remain alone, and though in that last day, the
Jesus Christ you love, remark he does not know me—there is a darker spirit will not
disown its child. … We have walked very pleasantly—Perhaps this is the point at which
our paths diverge—then pass on singing Sue, and up the distant hill I journey on”
(Johnson Letters 122).
The indefinite article in the second sentence of this excerpt (“Sue I have lived by
this”) seemingly refers to some way of life, some system of belief that Dickinson has
adhered to and chooses to continue adhering to although her friend Sue most likely
wishes to deter her from it. The first word in the following sentence (“It is the lingering
emblem…”) most likely also refers to the initial metonymy contained in “this.” To
follow is a strange, poetic declaration of faith, a set of sentences that could easily be
broken into poetic lines:
The lingering emblem of Heaven
I once dreamed,
and though if this is taken,
I shall remain alone
and though in that last day,
the Jesus Christ you love,
remark he does not know me—
there is a darker spirit will not disown its child
The letter explicitly expresses a need for Dickinson to remove herself from traditional
forms of religious expression. Again, as in Letter #77, she references a God that she does
not love (“the Jesus Christ you love”) yet here she offers no transformation of a religious
scenario to meet her unconventional spiritual needs. Rather, on the face of things with
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Susan she accepts the possibility of a dark spirit taking hold of her own. Yet I hesitate to
claim that Dickinson meant this altogether seriously. To me, her main focus in this letter
is to expound upon the difference in her relationship with Susan. In a way, she is calling
Susan out and subtly mocking her point of view—as if she is telling Sue not to worry
about her (Emily) not making it to Heaven, because she’ll have comfort with dark spirits
in Hell. The letter ends with one of Dickinson’s first poems, Poem #5, “I have a Bird in
Spring”:
I have a Bird in Spring
Which for myself doth sing—
The spring decoys
And as the summer nears—
And as the Rose appears,
Robin is gone.
Yet I do not repine
Knowing that Bird of mine
Though Flown—
Learneth beyond the sea
Melody new for me
And will return.
Fast in a safer hand
Held in a truer Land
Are mine—
And though they know depart,
Tell my doubting heart
They’re thine.
In a serener bright,
In a more golden light
I see
Each little doubt and fear,
Each little discord here
Removed.
Then I will not repine,
Knowing that Bird of mine
Though flown
Shall in a distant tree
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Bright melody for me
Return.
(Johnson Letters 123).

The enclosed poem utilizes an animal metaphor to explain Dickinson’s sense of hope and
optimism regarding her particular viewpoint. Because Dickinson ends her letter with the
phrase, “Then pass on singing Sue,” the Bird’s song in the poem is a direct comparison
with Sue’s traditional mode of praiseful songs of worship. Dickinson’s journey with
Susan and conventional religion has reached a fork in the road; while Sue passes on
singing, Dickinson listens for the Bird. Yet there is evidence of faith in this early poem.
Although the Robin disappears in summer, Dickinson fails to falter, as she is confident in
its return. In this manner Dickinson has created a metaphorical expression of her own
faith; this is not a linear spirituality but instead emerges as cyclical, represented by the
changing seasons causing the return of the Robin.
Letter #175, written in 1854 to Dr. and Mrs. J. G. Holland, also addresses how
Dickinson confronted the domineering presence of the church in her life. Dickinson
considered Mrs. Holland an “enduring” friend and many letters between the two reveal
how they shared intimate confidences:
The minister today preached about death and judgment and what would
become of those, meaning Austin and me, who behaved improperly—and
somehow the sermon scared me, and father and Vinnie looked very
solemn, as if the whole was true, and I would not for words have them
know that it troubled me, but I longed to come to you, and tell you about
it, and learn how to be better. He preached such an awful sermon, though
… the subject of perdition seemed to please him, somehow. It seems very
solemn to me. (Johnson Letters 124)
Besides Dickinson’s obvious disavowal of a religion based on fear (“perdition seemed to
please him”) the reaction of her father and sister Vinnie to the sermon seems important to
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me. Their “solemn” demeanor heightens Dickinson’s discomfort with the sermon. If her
father had shaken it off or slid a grin over to Austin and Emily, then her reaction to the
sermon might have been much different. I believe her perception of her father as
“solemn” indicates her own internal discord and perhaps even guilt regarding her
“improper behavior.” Though her family seems to accept her ultimate decision not to
join the church, perhaps they still do not fully condone this act—or perhaps Dickinson
simply fears this reaction and projects it onto those she cares most about. After all, the
letter contains no evidence that her father spoke to her regarding the sermon. She simply
looked over and perceived him to be reacting in a certain way. In my opinion, this subtle
perception points to Dickinson’s inner anxiety regarding her spiritual decision, although
the same excerpt reaffirms that she did not believe in conventional religion; the phrase
“looked very solemn as if it were true” leads a reader to conclude that ultimately
Dickinson held to some inner conviction that the horrors of Judgment Day as painted by
this minister were indeed false. The convictions and suppositions contained in this letter
as in many others illustrate Dickinson’s pressing concerns that would soon find a stage in
her facsimiles.
As Poem # 869, “Because the Bee May Blameless Hum,” illustrates, Dickinson
often conjured up fantastic scenarios for finding God, many times using animals and
other aspects of natural landscapes as springboards and talking points. Arguably,
Dickinson’s biggest point of contention with Puritan theology may have been in its
insistence on fear and selfloathing, its “blame” directed at her “humming.” Her poems
at times scoff at the idea of a punitive God—yet, in Dickinsonian fashion, she chooses
not to simply renounce the idea of hell. Similar to the way in which she approaches
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conventional, objectifying views of nature and animals, she also chooses to dwell in the
theological tradition, to satirize it and blow it out of proportion in order to demonstrate
her own rejection of fire and brimstone: “Emily Dickinson had needed, in an existential
manner, to transfer hell to the present moment. She wanted hell now and spent much of
her poetic energy in deliberately constructing it … the remarkable thing about her
approach is that she learned to turn the hell she was taught to believe in (and live in) into
a full life” (Keller 83).
More frequently than not, Dickinson utilizes humor (notably, satire and absurdity)
in her efforts to deride theological tradition, metaphorically taking us to the edge of the
“norms” that were proscribed for her in daily life as a woman in late nineteenth century
America. Poem #766, “My Faith is larger than the Hills,” relies heavily on an aesthetic
of “normative excess” (Miller). Dickinson utilizes religious language and imagery in
order to expose its inconsistencies; this poem ultimately leaves the reader with multiple
understandings and possibilities for religious conceptions and perceptions especially as
these relate to the natural world:
My Faith is larger than the Hills
So when the Hills decay—
My Faith must take the Purple Wheel
To show the Sun the way—
‘Tis first He steps upon the Vane—
And then—upon the Hill—
And then abroad the World He go
To do His Golden Will
And if His Yellow feet should miss—
The Bird would not arise—
The Flowers would slumber in their stems –
No Bells have Paradise—
How dare I, therefore, stint a faith
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On which so vast depends—
Lest Firmament should fail for me—
The Rivet in the Bands
(Johnson 375).
Starting with an image ripe with Biblical association (“Hills”), Dickinson immediately
pushes the metaphorical envelope. What at first read appears to be a celebratory gesture
towards religion and faith, the phrase “My faith is larger than the hills” becomes
immediately complicated by the “decay” of the hills that follows. Dickinson “assumes” a
dualist view in this poem and follows this position through to its strange and jostled
finish. If human faith is “otherworldly” and subsists even as the Hills decay, than this
faith must take over the duties of those Hills and act as a guide for the Sun who moves
across the Earth. Yet the poem exists in the conditional tense—if the Hills decay, then
“my faith” must take the purple wheel. And, because of this conditional, the poem seems
to enact two stances at once—one, it is the stance of a speaker questioning her faith (is
my faith strong enough to guide the Sun?), or two, is the poem conducting a mockery of a
Western conceptions of spirituality, calling attention to the human presumption to think
the world literally revolves according to “faith?” The mockery reveals itself fully at the
end of the poem.
In the third stanza, the poem articulates another hypothetical conditional situation
within the already existing hypothetical starting with the line: “If His Yellow feet should
miss—.” The speaker has already imagined the Hills decaying, and the resulting
responsibility of “my faith” to take over the role of the Hills. Now, the speaker imagines
that faith fails, or chooses not to accept the responsibility of the “Purple Wheel.” If this
scenario were to occur, the Sun’s yellow feet might “miss,” the “bird would not arise,”
the “flowers would slumber on,” etc. Presumably, the speaker expresses how important
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the role of faith is to the natural world—natural processes cannot occur without the Sun,
and the Sun cannot find its way along the ground without the guiding hand of Hills or
Faith. Yet the final stanza contains the most interesting language and subtly exposes the
satire that lies quietly behind the overarching language in the first stanza. The speaker
asks, “How dare I, therefore, stint a faith/ On which so vast depends?” This fascinating
question purposely hints at the intention behind the poem; truly, this poem so far contains
no “stint” (defined here as restriction, numbering, or limitation) of faith in its literal
choice of words. Quite the opposite, in fact—the poem has seemingly claimed that faith
is “large,” larger in size and temporal existence than any physical part of the landscape.
Therefore, because at the end of the poem the poet tells us that she has been “stinting”
faith, we understand the first stanza as a mockery of elevated language and its extended
metaphor and figurative situation (faith guiding the sun, etc.) as a subtle satire of certain
religious conventions and expressions. From Genesis 49:26: “Your father's blessings are
greater than the blessings of the ancient mountains, than the bounty of the ageold hills.”
So, Dickinson first sets up a biblical metaphor, and then admits that her project
has subversive intent by calling herself out in the final stanza. Yet this opening line in
stanza four hardly renounces her position. She asks, “How dare I stint a faith?” She does
not say, “I must stop stinting this faith.” The tone is tongueincheek, mocking, and near
exuberant. She seems to ask her reader, “Are you wondering how I have the courage to
stint, mock, and satirize this faith?” And the answer, for the reader, is contained in the
poem itself. In Dickinson’s metaphorical rendering of a “faith greater than the hills,” the
faith must assume duties and responsibilities of the greatest natural forces on Earth—in
this case, the Sun. The poet has created narrative “excess” or a nearabsurd situation in
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order to mock hierarchical conceptions of faith and nature. Because her poetic project
has taught her the shortcomings and defaults of a linear, more conventional
understanding of the world, the poem emerges as a critical alternative to mainstream
thought. Metaphors and situations are conflated, Faith and Hills change places, and the
Sun assumes qualities of a God or Divine. Indeed, the poem concludes at an imagined
“breaking point”: “Lest Firmament should fail for me/The Rivet in the Bands.” This
phrase serves as the answer to the previous question—“How dare I stint a faith?” The
speaker ends the poem with a question and answer series that rings with a certain amount
of confidence in the subversion just conducted, but still remains vulnerable to the
question and definition of faith. The speaker, again, is posing this question to the reader:
“Are you wondering how I have the courage to stint a faith? Are you wondering why I
continue to question faith, how I can live with the risk of no heaven, with the risk of
death of soul as well as body?” “Lest Firmament should fail for me”—and the “for me”
is the crucial turn in this phrase. The “stinting,” the limiting and questioning of faith that
the poet has undertaken, has the ability to break her at the end. When Firmament
(defined as sky, heavens, a physical page in the Bible) is broken, the Rivet (bolt) in the
Bands also presumably breaks—the pieces holding together our mortal life might snap as
well. And this is how the poem ends, at an imagined break, an assumed fissure.
The humor in Poem #766 is satirical, relying on “excess” in order to articulate
cultural subversion. At its beginning, the poem appears to “follow the rules”; it adheres
to a Biblical diction and metaphorical setup. But as the poem makes the metaphor more
and more extreme and finally admits at its end that it is willing to risk its break, or
“failure,” the humor emerges defined clearly as mockery of religious language, achieved
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through exaggeration and absurdity. Yet the poet does not ignore the part she herself has
played in constructing conventions as well as refuting them. Ultimately, the poet cannot
stand wholly on one side of the fence or the other. She is indebted to convention, in the
sense that her own language could not resonate or stand full without the metaphors and
expressions that have come before her. Yet she is involved in exposing language’s
inconsistencies and problems, as expressed in Poem #766. The mockery in a poem like
#766 includes the speaker in its web, and the humor is selfdeprecating as well as
outwardly political; the poet mocks her own ego as much as she mocks the egos of those
around her. It is not “your faith” or “his faith” that the speaker chooses to expose and
subvert throughout the poem; it is “my faith.” As Cristianne Miller proposes in her
essay, “The Humor of Excess,” rarely will Dickinson articulate a clear, unsullied
perspective:
There is no clear ground of innocence or safety from which the speaker
may mock or criticize particular aspects of the world or human nature.
Instead, just as the speaker is the focus of the poem’s excess, the object of
the humor overlaps or becomes elided with the subject speaker such that
she also becomes its object. Rather than mocking or challenging God, the
publishing industry, patriarchal domestic life, or her own family … here
Dickinson puts her own perception and body on the line: the extremity of
her questioning leaves no stable position behind. (Miller 104)

Dickinson’s selfindictment and unwillingness to separate herself from topics and
concerns in the poem, both figuratively and formally, attest to her understanding of the
formal and literary perspectives of the nineteenth century. The poem “My Faith is larger
than the Hills” presents a singular speaker who utilizes natural settings en route to a fuller
subjective experience, according with Romantic formulations of a speaker encountering
nature. Through this framework, Dickinson contains herself in a Romantic scenario. Yet
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the unfinished quality to the poem, including the impression that the speaker remains in
an uncertain theoretical and emotional space, draws the very “formula of transcendence”
into question.
As an author, Dickinson rarely places herself on a pedestal looking down over her
subject matter. She occupies the minds of cats, birds, and hills—she mocks and
challenges patriarchal norms. By utilizing excessive metaphor and situational imagery in
Poem #766, Dickinson challenges the system that places “faith” and/or religion “above”
natural processes. In her extended absurd narrative that situates “faith” driving the Purple
Wheel to guide the Sun, she mocks biblical and religious language. Moreover, the poem
seems to refute conventional religious interpretations of natural processes and events:
“Humor of excess issues from the poet’s profound sense of displacement, or an
imagination that has been prompted by repeated experiences of alterity to fantasize a
world in which nothing takes its proscribed form … the language, scenes, and patterns of
these poems create disorder in the social and natural worlds … so profound is the
falseness of the order she perceives that she can imagine no alternative reordering or new
system working from these same parts, and so demonstrates graphically and linguistically
the chaos she at least occasionally would prefer to the proscribed apparent order she must
live within” (Miller 105). The conclusion of poem #766 is chaotic—we are left in an
imagined situation, where Firmament has failed similar to the Rivet in a Band breaking
apart. Yet the poem retains a startling confidence amidst this “breaking—,” ultimately,
this remains an “enacted” chaos. There is a subtle smile among these lines, as a daring
poet has stepped forward to reimagine her life and faith; this is a clever speaker who can
heighten alreadyelevated language in order to expose its inconsistencies. Yet as Miller
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states, “The grimace is never far behind the guffaw, or grin” (115); and if faith can only
be reworked and believed in via hyperbolic analogy, why do we continue to follow
prescriptions of a false faith in our relationships to the natural world and to one another?
Dickinson repeatedly attempts alternate visions of church, community, and culture in
addition to exploring how religion tends to inaccurately represent its relationship to the
natural world in language: “Dickinson’s language of excess and her fantastic, violent
metaphors of physical substance constitute attempts to reconfigure the relationship of
nature to culture, or to ‘redesign’ the universe” (Miller 129). Moreover, as in Poem
#869, “Because the Bee may Blameless Hum,” animals continue to play a metaphorical
role in Dickinson’s humorous reformulations of traditional theology.
Meanwhile, Poem # 465, “I heard a fly buzz—when I died,” reexamines the
“bridge” between the present life and the afterlife and assigns multifaceted qualities to
death and dying as opposed to the more binary perceptions of life and death as contained
in traditional religion:
I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—
The Stillness in the Room
Was like the Stillness in the Air
Between the Heaves of Storm
The Eyes around—had wrung them dry—
And Breaths were gathering firm
For that last onset—when the King
Be witnessed—in the Room
I willed my Keepsakes—Signed away
What portion of me be
Assignable—and then it was
There interposed a Fly—
With Blue—uncertain stumbling Buzz—
Between the light—and me—
And then the Windows failed—and then

 22 

I could not see to see
(Johnson 224).

The poem is deliberately wry from its outset and outlines a seeming impossibility at work
in many of Dickinson’s poems—a speaker has died and is describing the process of dying
after death has already occurred. By situating the speaker as already “dead,” Dickinson
here emphasizes that when ministers and theologians attempt to articulate death and what
dying might be like they are simply “playing” as she plays here—imagining scenarios
and objectifying persons or other beings in an effort to understand the unknowable. This
“playing” reflects a common claim in Romantic writing—that through creative agency, a
poet can level out the reifications of church and culture. From the first phrase, “I heard a
Fly buzz,” the poem calls attention to the purely quotidian nature of this event; it is a day
like any other with flies buzzing around; and yet, the act of listening to a fly also
emphasizes the primacy of physical sensation. The speaker hears an insect at the exact
moment of her death—does she continue to hear the fly as she “becomes” dead? Placing
the animal sound directly at the “bridge” of life and death is a fascinating poetic
construction. Presumably, the speaker hears the fly before death as well as after it;
therefore, an animal sound (and perhaps by extension, some part of animality itself)
exists both before death and after it. Furthermore, the poem itself equates a flashback—
the second and third stanzas describe events that immediately preceded the sound of the
fly, and then the fourth stanza returns to the moment of listening. This act of moving
back and forth in time, of moving back and forth over and around death, calls attention to
how humans attempt to order and compose existence. Furthermore, because the speaker
is listening to an “animal sound,” perhaps Dickinson again shows that animals are closer
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to “death” and also closer to comprehending a veritable reality than humans. The
metaphor of the fly seems particularly suitable for this project as flies literally eat off of
and lay eggs in dead bodies; a disquieting disparity emerges from the poem because of
this macabre setup. Although humans tend to glorify death in its revelatory or divine
qualities, this speaker subverts our expectation of the majestic by emphasizing the literal
rot of a dying body. In my opinion, this emphasis on the literal human flesh works to
destabilize Christianity’s dualist interpretation of living and dying. It is the sound of the
fly that bridges the gap between the worlds—the sound that seemingly exists in both
worlds. And although the speaker at the end states, “I could not see to see,” she does not
say “I could not hear to hear” – as if the sound of the fly, occupying the space between
“the light and me,” continued to be a guidance and focal point for the speaker.
Dickinson conducts her reexamination of theology by capitalizing on elements of
the ludicrous and the “grotesque” as humorous mechanisms. As Suzanne Juhasz
articulates, Dickinson’s “tease” or desire to jab at the ribs of her patriarchal culture
extends even to the most “sacred” of subjects: “Death as well as love becomes an
occasion for the tease. In poems about death, tease again reveals two different but related
functions: first, destabilizing existing definitions; second, flirting—the invitation of
desire. Visàvis death, tease is used as a procedure for investigation; the preferred
methodology for trying to understand this most evasive, most mysterious, most teasing of
subjects” (Juhasz 47). In “I heard a Fly Buzz,” the entire poem presents itself as a tease,
or a surreal fantasy. The speaker is not dead; she has lips, brain, and thought processes
intact and she is writing a poem. The tease succeeds in that it knocks around the idea of
which aspects of “being” persist after death, and which aspects cease. Ultimately, the
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poem presents no answer. The speaker “cannot see,” but the wording again is strange
and nearly in jest—“I could not see to see.” As if the speaker were still “seeing,” only
seeing in a wholly different fashion, a “sight” entirely incomprehensible to the readers,
but a sight nonetheless. And the teasing here does act as an invitation to the reader, a
request that the reader join the poet in this “afterlife” and see the sights that she is seeing.
The offer, though eerie, is tempting because of the speaker’s implied knowledge: “Tease
as a procedure for destabilizing definitions is particularly appropriate in this context (of
death), for as Dickinson points out over and over, neither the Christian belief in a Heaven
for the soul nor science’s belief in a dissolution for the body will do it … From her
perspective as outside the normative systems of knowledge and belief, she can work at
and worry its meaning. Consequently, Dickinson’s poems about death scrupulously
unravel its meaning from those definitions already in existence” (Juhasz 47).
So if poem #465 deemphasizes the expectation of the afterlife through its
emphasis on the mortal flesh and sensate movements, might Dickinson be working to
undermine the theoretical presence of the afterlife as a redemptive solace to hopeful man?
Many poems conduct an easy occupation of a death scene, utilizing a speaker with an
ability to speak back to humans from beyond the grave. If a poet delegitimizes the idea
of an “afterlife,” then, presumably, the “present life” gains more importance;
furthermore, if the “soul” or spirit that carries through one life into the next is de
constructed, then perhaps there is more room for nonhuman creatures to experience
physical and even a potentially “spiritual” existence in Dickinson’s poems. Allowing
animals access to spirituality (or bringing humans down off of their spiritual pedestals)
might be another way that Dickinson reformulates the binary setup of her culture—
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instead of bemoaning the ambiguity of the afterlife, perhaps she finds solace and
redemption in an emphasis on the physical fly and how it feeds and thrives on carcass,
reflecting a greater connection with animals and landscape: “Refusing to ignore the
blinding resonance of light/dark metaphors that occurred and recurred throughout her
culture, Dickinson explored these metaphors, revised them, and, finally, transformed
them, according to her own ‘premises,’ her own actual experiences as woman writing”
(Barker 132133).
Poem # 1275, “The Spider as an Artist” contains another reworked metaphor:
The Spider as an Artist
Has never been employed—
Though his surpassing Merit
Is freely certified
By every Broom and Bridget
Throughout a Christian Land—
Neglected Son of Genius
I take thee by the Hand
(Johnson 557)

This poem, another lighthearted interrogation, fascinatingly conjectures how and why
Western cultures understand and value animal abilities. The spider has never been
“employed” although his weaving abilities are unequaled in man, and Dickinson
succinctly details the hypocrisy of an entirely humancentered Christian culture. The
spider’s merit is “certified” by all “brooms and bridgets” across the Christian land—yet
because of its animality, there is no room for the spider to contribute or participate in
Christian culture. The poem’s speaker feels an affinity for the neglected artist—
presumably the speaker feels neglected as well—and forms a symbolic allegiance with
the spider. Yet the most interesting metaphorical move in the poem is the labeling of the
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spider as “Son of Genius.” This phrase makes an implicit comparison to Son of God, as
if this spider were as much a Christ figure as the human embodiment of God as figured in
Christian texts. Nevertheless, the difference between the word God and Genius is
immense—Dickinson seems to call attention to the fact that no animal can ever be
considered a “son of God.” Finally, when the speaker takes the spider “by the hand,” she
assigns human qualities to it—the spider receives, in metaphor, Heidegger’s “hand,”
becomes a creature that exhibits “Being” with a capital B. Ultimately, Dickinson claims
that this spider, with his ability to weave and make art, is as comparable and able a
creature as any human being.
Furthermore, the pointedly comic nature of the poem’s subject matter and diction
(when the word “employ” is placed next to spider, one cannot help but think of a line of
spiders performing tasks at a factory) raises the issue that perhaps the poet does not desire
or seek out a place in the mainstream publishing industry simply because she does not
want to participate. The poem highlights a certain triumphant loneliness for the
speaker—without human comfort and companionship, she will take the hands of spiders.
This gesture exposes both the anthropocentric and androcentric underpinnings of her
culture and society; if a piece of art or a trade cannot be bought and sold, it is worthless in
the eyes of Christian men and women. Implicit in this reading is an understanding also
how Christianity and “industry” are linked; in this “Christian” land, animals are
misunderstood and misinterpreted as valueless unless commodified, and human progress
marches fervently onwards: “Animals play major roles in Dickinson’s funny poems,
which often function as fables that comment on human foibles” (Smith, Juhasz, Miller
16).
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Close readings reveal Dickinson’s tendency to assign otherworldly characteristics
to animals as well as to express uncertainty towards traditional conceptions of the human
soul as well as the afterlife. Dickinson’s allowances for animals and nature reflect
evolving, unfixed doubt regarding religion and spirituality, yet many of the poems,
although radical in scope and intent, reflect not only an inherent reliance on
Romanticism, but also the framework of Puritanism: “When ministers preached on
godliness in wives, they were calling women to an intently active existence on all levels,
emotional and spiritual, physical and practical. There was no such thing as a dull, weak,
idle Puritan woman. On its cosmological scale of souls, therefore, early Puritanism
promised women an authentic existence. In large measure, Emily Dickinson wrote
because of that promise” (Keller 13). Interestingly, perhaps the cause of Dickinson’s
rebellion against church and culture found root less in the theology itself, but in the
cultural and social understanding of and expression of that theology. Puritanism
emphasized an “inner realm,” a very personal relationship with God, and even, to an
extent, seeking out very individual terms on which to encounter God: “Puritanism’s
dignifying (and perhaps also cruel) cosmic demands on the individual soul rather
automatically assured women considerable elevation within the covenants of faith over
her status in any comparable contemporary culture” (Keller 12). Yet despite promising
women this “authentic” existence, men retained most if not all the power in church and
state; Dickinson utilizes Puritanism’s emphasis on inner contemplation to ultimately
expose its inherent reliance on patriarchy. Still, Dickinson’s rebellion against
Christianity is not a wholehearted refutation of religion. She continues to emphasize the
spiritual; her concern with reformulating religious language as regards to nature most
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likely reflects her own conviction that the natural world has as much right to “God” as the
human world. Indeed, she seems to long for transcendence, an overarching meaning in
nature, culture, and self: “Dickinson returns repeatedly to nature in her poems as a place
to learn about herself as well as a place for the largest canvas of selfdisplay. In this
sense, her concern ceases to be (the postmodern) with roles or conventions of
representation and becomes more a (Romantic) concern with what might be called
essence—the most profound sense of who and what kind of thing she is” (Miller 136).
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Chapter 2: Sublime Resemblances
Many critics situate Dickinson’s work under the lens of Romanticism, especially
the American strains of this literary and cultural movement. Dickinson was an ardent
reader; her journals and letters note her thoughts and questions as she plowed through
other poets and essayists of her time: “Most certainly Blake, Wordsworth, and Keats are
there somewhere in her (Dickinson’s) poetry, I feel, as are Thoreau and Melville, maybe
even Poe. By the 1850’s and 1860’s, however, practically everyone who read British
poets at all had, to one degree or another, seen a world in a grain of sand and had, for one
purpose or another, wandered lonely as a cloud” (Keller 32728). Arguably, Dickinson
was entirely aware of the breadth and impact of the Romantic movement, including its
emphasis and celebration of the natural world: “To claim the endorsement of nature is
important at any time, but it was especially so in the Romantic age, when the ‘natural’
became a source and criterion of the good” (Perkins 31). Furthermore, within
Romanticism’s emphasis on the “natural” was a particular reformulation of how nature
(notably landscapes and animals) should be treated and perceived in Western society.
Because of Romanticism’s “civilizing” tendencies and insistence on the primacy of
feelings, cruelty toward animals soon became a quality of nineteenth century life to be
criticized and condemned: “Cruelties to animals were said to be not only unnatural but
also anachronistic, atavistic, characteristic of an unenlightened past. Hence they were
termed savage” (Perkins 31).
Romantic poets, essayists, and other writers articulated and depicted these cultural
shifts in regard to “animal rights” in differing ways. Early Romantic writers such as
Wordsworth and Coleridge tended to use animals in poetry in order to call attention to
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human conditions rather than highlight indignities facing the animal itself: “Poets might
describe ungrateful and abusive treatment of work animals and thus glance at similar
injustice to human laborers” (Perkins 107). As a clear example, Coleridge’s “To An Ass”
comments on a sociopolitical situation that suppresses humans of particular races and
social status. Rhetorically, he persuades the reader by utilizing the image and emotional
tenor of a tethered animal:
Poor little foal of an oppressèd race!
I love the languid patience of thy face:
And oft with gentle hand I give thee bread,
And clap thy ragged coat, and pat thy head.
(Coleridge)
The fact that a poet could successfully use an animal as an instrument and symbol of
sympathy for suffering attests to a rising appreciation and care for animals among the
general reading public. And, indeed, many poets did explicitly celebrate animals in
poems and stories, attributing soulful and/or angelic qualities to an animal that a more
“imperfect” human might also aspire to: “Poems such as Keats’s ‘Ode to a Nightingale,’
Wordsworth’s ‘The Green Linnet,’ and Shelley’s ‘To a Skylark,’ endow animals with
qualities that they do not have and that humans beings also lack but long to have: joy,
immortality, unity of being, transcendent knowledge, immediacy to God. Such poems
involve a reversal of hierarchy, placing the animal above human limitations, where it can
no longer represent any group within the social structure” (Perkins 107108). Indeed, we
can read Shelley’s “To a Skylark” as an iconic representation of the Romantic celebration
of nature; notably, birds emerged as a powerful symbol of freedom, flight, and
imagination for these poets:
Hail to thee, blithe Spirit!
Bird thou never wert,
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That from Heaven, or near it,
Pourest thy full heart
In profuse strains of unpremeditated art.
Higher still and higher
From the earth thou springest
Like a cloud of fire;
The blue deep thou wingest,
And singing still dost soar, and soaring ever singest.
(Shelley)

In addition to simply celebrating animals and natural landscapes, Romantic
writers frequently utilized nature as a source of “transcendence” or “redemption” for
humans in an increasingly technological and “rational” society: “The metaphysics of
subjectobject interaction parallels the exemplary lyric form which Wordsworth
established in Tintern Abbey: an individual confronts a natural scene and makes it abide
his question, and the interchange between his mind and nature constitutes the entire
poem, which usually poses and resolves a spiritual crisis” (Abrams Supernaturalism 92).
Nature becomes a source of redemption or sublimation for the poet—by meditating on a
natural scene, a poet can come to a conclusion about himself. Despite the emphasis on
the necessity of natural places and creatures for achieving this awakening, the process of
transcendence still takes place in the mind of the speaker, demonstrating that
Romanticism’s emphasis lay in its belief in the power of subjectivity and imagination,
rather than in any inherent power in the natural scene. In other words, Romantic power
emerges from how a man uses a natural landscape via the act of thinking and
contemplation: “For it is not nature but ‘the Mind of Man’ which is the ‘main region of
my song’ and in the passage in which Wordsworth speaks of ‘Power, Creation, and
Divinity itself,’ he speaks ‘not of outward things’ but of ‘what passed within me’ and of
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‘my youthful mind.’ In the final analysis the view that informs The Prelude is not
naturalism, but humanism” (Abrams Supernaturalism 94).
Therefore, the codified Romantic project primarily utilizes natural symbolism in
order to achieve humanistic ends. Few poets attempted to occupy the mind of an animal
purely for the sake of doing so, or to question the “natureasobject” mindset prevailing
in common culture. In nineteenthcentury America, the same celebration of natural
landscapes and animals had extended across the Atlantic, yet these writers also focused
on nature as a “thing” to be contemplated, examined, changed, ignored, or upheld—
hardly ever was nature allowed to “exist” as nature. In particular, Ralph Emerson, a
leading Transcendentalist thinker and poet in America in the nineteenth century, retained
a strong “subjectobject” relationship to the natural world, although he viewed natural
“objects” as redemptory and positive for American “subjects”:
Emerson, like other Romantics, empowers the human eye in nature. The
first chapter of Nature famously credits the poet’s eye with the power to
create nature by abstracting its unruly plentitude and its traces of particular
human labor into a smooth and total horizon … For Emerson, a landscape
may contain other human beings as farmers but scarcely other seers; on
any given horizon, the poet’s ‘transparent eyeball’ is singular (Loeffeholz
13).

From my particular position, it is interesting to note if and how “occupation of nature”
exists in Dickinson’s poetry. Emerson’s project seems to reflect manifest destiny—the
poet is an explorer into nature, one who must put nature into categories that he can
understand and use in order to cultivate a broader “understanding” of himself and his
human motivations. Although Dickinson’s quest also seems bent on understanding, her
use of nature as an avenue to fuller comprehension is less invasive, less categorical, and
less solipsistic than Emerson’s. Indeed, her project seems consciously gendered in the
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sense that she does not participate in the traditionally male role of “colonist.” As a
female speaker and author, assuming ownership of landscape and animals had to be
particularly troubling for Dickinson, which is perhaps a reason that she attempts a
different relationship to nature: “(Dickinson) demonstrates that she cannot write, nor does
she wish to write, poems that literally repeat male poets’ encounters with nature”
(Loeffelholz 8). How can a female poet and thinker participate in a cultural dialogue that
excludes her as a subject and associates her gender with the natural object? “Women, as
custodians of natural detail (gardeners, miniaturists, stereotypically given to numbering
the streaks of a tulip) rather than sublime wholeness, are customarily denied the ‘use’ of
nature” (Loeffelholz 9). Should a female poet identify with the natural object and “make
reply” to male invasive movements and speeches? Or, perhaps in a more complex and
intricate project, should a female poet display and parody the perverse relationship of
male subject to feminized object while attempting her own reformulated relationship to
the “other” with which she is associated?
In addition to celebrating the “natural,” Romantic projects also often centered on
certain denunciations of institutionalized religion—Emerson, in particular, famously
renounced the idea of a “skygod” in an address before Divinity College in Cambridge in
1838: “In the soul then let the redemption be sought. Wherever a man comes, all books
are legible, all things transparent, all religions are forms. He is religious. Man is the
underworker. He is seen amid miracles. All men bless and curse. The stationariness of
religion; the assumption that the age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed; the
fear of degrading the character of Jesus by representing him as a man; indicate with
sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It is the office of the true teacher to
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show us that God is, not was; that he speaketh, not spake. The true Christianity—a faith
like Christ’s in the infinitude of man—is lost” (Emerson 122123). In general,
Romanticists sought in turn to replace “otherworldly” divinity with the more subjective
power of imagination, genius, or creativity: “ ‘Someone who looks,’—of all Romantic
innovations, none has so preempted the attention of poets, novelists, and painters (and the
critics of poetry, novels, and painting) as the concern with the eye and the object and the
need for a revolution in seeing which will make the object new. And to our own day the
chief definitions of transforming vision have continued to be recognizable, if somewhat
distorted, variations on the Romantic categories of freshness of sensation” (Abrams
Supernaturalism 411). Dickinson’s own fervent, obsessive questioning in regard to
Protestant Christianity seem to parallel the general literary tendency of the period—she
utilizes the theoretical power of the “I,” she relies on extreme, sensate moments as
metaphorical turn and symbols, and she often supplants divine power with the power of
her own imagination or vision. Yet I feel that Dickinson covers far more theoretical
ground than her contemporaries in addressing the question of how the natural world
should accord or fit into the human conception of imaginative power. Whereas poets like
Wordsworth or Keats tend to utilize the natural world as a means to an end, i.e., as a
method of demonstrating or cultivating human imagination, for Dickinson the natural
world is often the figurative end. She creates communities in which a speaker conducts
dialogues with animals or natural landscapes and rarely evinces a wish to move beyond
this interaction. In her confrontations with nature, a subject rarely “emerges” up and over
to another side, more powerful in imagination and poetic ability.
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Dickinson’s disavowal of religion and her “translation” of spirituality into an
endeavor that includes the natural world does relate to another emphasis of many
Romantic poets—the poetic search for “otherness,” or the quest for emergent presences
outside of or beyond dominant paradigms of church and state. Some Romantic poets
such as Wordsworth or Keats looked to nature as a source of otherness, some such as
Byron or Rimbaud turned to intoxicants, some such as Blake turned to mysticism as well
as visual arts. Gary Lee Stonum depicts the encounter with “otherness” as the overlying
definition of the romantic sublime: “The Sublime is organized as some form of sudden
encounter with otherness” (Stonum 69). As Stonum continues to articulate, the Romantic
encounter follows a specific threetiered journey: “The encounter always proceeds
according to a threephase sequence that in one form or another can thus be regarded as
the invariant structure of the romantic sublime” (Stonum 69). The three phases of the
Romantic sublime are 1) normative 2) traumatic and 3) sublimation (Stonum 69).
Broadly, I understand the process as follows: first, the poet exists in his/her everyday,
habitual life. Then, upon encounter with an “other” (nature, dream, drug) the poet
undergoes a transformation and the traditional manner of relating with the world has been
disrupted. The other dares the speaker to behave differently: “(An object) challenges the
subject’s dignity by means of the drastic contrast opened up between its powers and his
or her own” (Stonum 69). The speaker’s held beliefs about existing systems and even
about himself or herself have been permanently altered. Finally, the “other” departs from
the scene, and the speaker is left to experience elevation, empowerment, or release.
Often, this “release” includes a sense of a reinvigorated creative power.
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It is crucial to consider how the “other” operates in Dickinson’s poetry and
therefore how the “three phases” of the romantic sublime experience shift or change as a
result. When we remember that Dickinson depicts animals and nature less as “others”
and more as “partners,” how can we understand her particular conception of what a
“sublime” might hold? If Dickinson possesses a more unmediated relationship with
nature due to her understanding that patriarchal systems have worked to demean both
nonhuman creatures and women alike, then a “Dickinson sublime” must include her
understanding that “nature as other” is imbedded in maledominated power systems. In
some sense, experiencing trauma followed by sublimation as a result of the encountered
“other” implies that the “other” is a thing to be subsumed. Although the emphasis in a
traditional Romantic encounter shifts from the external representation of the “other” to its
internal representation, an implicit hierarchy remains—that the “subject” can use the
“other” to accomplish his/her own ends and that the two entities are ultimately separate
things. Stonum refers to this tendency as “heroic”: “If the romantic sublime thus
centrally involves a poetics of mastery, out of the writings of Dickinson’s own time the
paradigmatic figure of the one seeking such mastery would be Robert Browning’s Childe
Roland, as Harold Bloom has frequently argued. The romantic sublime specifically lends
itself to heroic questing” (Stonum 76).
Feminist critic Patricia Yaeger hints that Dickinson may have been one of the first
nineteenth century female poets to mount a confrontational reworking of the “masculine
sublime”: “The female poet accompanied by a halo, or fiery trail of language, is a
dazzling image, and, with its premonition of hypsos—of power and influence, of
transport and height—is an image conspicuously absent, with the exception of the poems
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of Emily Dickinson, from the poetic lexicon of the nineteenth century” (Yaeger 194). As
stated earlier, Dickinson’s represented relationship with the natural world does not
dutifully replicate the experience offered by her contemporaries; instead, it seems to offer
a different experience of sublimity. As Yaeger explains, many feminist writers
(Dickinson included, I would argue) do not completely denounce the sublime experience,
but rather change its setup or result to an extent that they may at once deride its
appropriating tendencies while also retaining its sense of empowerment: “The woman
writer who writes in the sublime mode writes differently; in order to overcome her
exclusion from the dialectic of negative power enacted in the conventional sublime, she
produces a prosody of transcendence, but in a different key” (Yaeger 199). Although
Yaeger conjectures that there may be many types of “feminine sublimes” (some caegories
include a ‘sublime of mathematics’ or a ‘preoedipal sublime’) I find two of her
categories to be particularly compelling in my reading of Dickinson: first, the “failed
sublime”: “In texts where it (the ‘failed sublime’) occurs, we witness a woman’s
dazzling, unexpected empowerment followed by a moment in which this power is
snatched away—often by a masculine countersublime that has explicit phallic
components … the heroine finds herself not only stripped of transcendent powers, but
bereft, in a lower social stratum than before” (Yaeger 201). Dickinson’s poem, “My Life
Had Stood—a Loaded Gun” is a fascinating and compelling example of a “failed
sublime” that I will discuss in Chapter 4. Yaeger’s second persuasive category is a
“sovereign” or “horizontal sublime”: “The second strategy women writers use to
appropriate the sublime as literary mode I will define as the ‘sovereign sublime.’ In this
reinvention of the conventional sublime the woman writer appears to be appropriating a
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male genre in a straight forward or mimetic way, and thus to be vulnerable to its structure
of violence and domination. But in this appropriation something happens to the
sublime’s tidy structure. Typically, the male poet writing in the sublime mode will stage
a moment of blockage, which is followed by a moment of imagistic brilliance. … In the
‘sovereign’ sublime this economy of domination changes, however, and rather than a
vertical flight toward mastery through height, the woman writer invents either a
horizontal sublime, as we saw in Irigaray, or else what we might call a ‘sublime of
expenditure’ in which the writer expends or spills whatever power the sublime moment—
in its structure of crisis, confrontation, and renewed domination, has promised to hoard”
(Yaeger 202). A “spilling” action accords significantly to how Dickinson tends to
explain meaning or communicate knowledge in her poems: “Regardless of how one
accounts for it theoretically, the motif of a central wildness describes effects familiar to
most readers of Dickinson’s poetry. Riddling, provocative, and idiosyncratic intensities
of language are found in varying degrees in almost every poem she wrote” (Stonum 61).
Indeed, Dickinson often describes moments of “transcendence” utilizing either blazing,
vanquishing metaphors of volcanoes and lightning (“Will not cry with joy, Pompeii!”) or,
oppositely, metaphors of blindness (“I could not see to see”). Rather than indulging the
reader with detailed images, moments of transcendence are often marked by abrupt
endings or abstract oneliners.
Poem # 978, “It bloomed and dropt, a Single Noon,” is an interesting illustration
of how a Dickinsonian speaker “spills” or does not consume the knowledge proffered by
a sublime experience with an other:
It bloomed and dropt, a Single Noon—
The Flower—distinct and Red—
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I, passing, thought another Noon
Another in its stead
Will equal glow, and thought no More
But came another Day
To find the Species disappeared—
The Same Locality—
The Sun in place—no other fraud
On Nature’s perfect Sum—
Had I but lingered Yesterday—
Was my retrieveless blame—
Much Flowers of this and further Zones
Have perished in my Hands
For seeking its Resemblance—
But unapproached it stands—
The single Flower of the Earth
That I, in passing by
Unconscious was—Great Nature’s Face
Passed infinite by Me—
(Johnson 457).
In the poem, the speaker “misses” or “overlooks” the knowledge proffered by an
element of the natural landscape. In the first stanza, the speaker encounters a brilliant
“Noon,” colored like a flower, “distinct and red,” but decided to pass by the noon and,
presumably, not to further contemplate its wondrousness because there would be another
Noon the next day. However, despite returning to “the same locality” the following day,
the speaker cannot find this singular “species” of Noon. The speaker then berates
herself—“Had I but lingered Yesterday/ Was my retrieveless blame.” The final stanza
attests to the great power that was “missed” because the speaker passed on: “Great
Nature’s Face / Passed infinite by Me—.” Seemingly, the speaker draws a connection
between this particular brilliant Noon and “infinity.” If the speaker had stopped to
contemplate and, presumably, encounter the other along the “proper” lines of the

 40 

sublime, perhaps she would have come to some greater apprehension and understanding
of “infinity.” But infinity passed by with the Noon, and the speaker did not stop to
describe or intimate its presence.
Furthermore, interesting considerations arise when we consider what Dickinson
may have wanted to comment on through her particular “horizontal” or illbegotten
sublime moment in this poem. This particular poem seems less a gendered reaction to
how society may preclude a woman from participating in a predominant mode of
experience, but more a question as to how the sublime purports to operate. Despite the
speaker’s conviction that she “missed” something in her encounter with the first “Noon,”
a type of sublimation still occurs as a result of her encounter with the second “Noon.”
First, a “normative” speaker experiences an “other,” but doesn’t understand how
powerful that “other” is. Then, when the speaker tries to recapture the first experience
through “resemblance” (a second experience of a similar “other”) a moment of crisis and
realization occurs. The realization is that no knowledge has been gained because the
speaker postponed the sublime moment. Yet, there is some knowledge, after all, as a
result of the comparison between the “Noons.” The knowledge is the speaker’s
conviction that “truth” and “infinity” were only contained within the original image.
There is no transcendence in a typical Romantic sense, because the speaker assumed a
particularity of nature could be duplicated. Yet the speaker still comes to an important
realization, one that speaks to how the sublime should operate within the setup of the
poem. The speaker claims that the “species” of “Noon” that she witnessed yesterday had
“disappeared” today, and she attempts no sublimation of the new “Noon” in its place.
The speaker seems to subconsciously state that no “resemblance” can take the place of
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the “original”: “Much Flowers of this and further Zones / Have perished in my Hands /
/For seeking its Resemblance.” The original “perishes” under the weight of
representation. In this “horizontally sublime” moment, not only does the speaker blunder
and miss her opportunity for transcendence, she also implicitly questions the validity of
representing these moments. For the speaker presumably returned to the “same locality”
in order to perform the act of representation—and found that this act eluded her.
“Infinity” cannot be written down or represented, except in grand, capitalized phrases—
attesting to the poet’s inability to represent these concepts through detailed metaphor or
imagery.
Stonum notes that Dickinson possesses Romantic structures in her work, but he
admits that the project remains distant from her contemporaries: “One challenge for
Dickinson is to find some way of circumventing mastery without giving up the
experiential intensity she values or the promise of transcendence that the sublime always
holds out. More generally, as this challenge may suggest, the romantic sublime is less an
answer to Dickinson’s problems than the matrix in which they appear. Her own
unorthodox version of the romantic sublime then specifically responds to such problems”
(Stonum 77). The “problem” (referenced by Stonum and Yaeger) with the sublime is one
of mastery, or, in my words, the problem of how to encounter the “other.” When
Dickinson faces the “other” in nature, whether that other be a Jay, a Spider, a Fly, a Deer,
or a Mountain, she articulates a distinctly different reactive phase. I agree with Stonum
that she seems to be following the “matrix” or formula for encountering nature in her
poetry—and I would argue that within this depiction is a subtle mockery of its lingering
attempts at containment or transcendence through consumption. Moreover, Dickinson
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seems to hint at the possibilities for a feminist sublime, as outlined by Yaeger, because of
how she articulates poetic “knowledge” and “transcendence”—ultimately, these are not
despairing poems—Dickinson’s is a strong, luminous poetry. Ultimately, Dickinson’s
project is indebted to Romanticism; without its theoretical support, she would have been
unable to contemplate nature as a place of spiritual solace and physical awareness. Yet
Dickinson’s poems also expose the shortcomings of the movement, including its
patriarchal tendencies and adherence to linearity and hierarchy. In these fractious works,
she frequently parodies the sublimation sequence or leaves it incomplete in a seeming
desire to illustrate how its aims and methods do not serve her project fully.
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Chapter 3: Making Animal Faces
One of Dickinson’s somewhat “early” poems from 1862, poem # 507, “She sights
a Bird—she chuckles,” is a humorous lyric detailing a shecat stalking its prey. The
poem is light and comic, depicting a potentially “tragic” scene with a light touch:
She sights a Bird—she chuckles—
She flattens—then she crawls—
She runs without the look of feet—
Her eyes increase to Balls—
Her Jaws stir—twitching—hungry—
Her Teeth can hardly stand—
She leaps, but Robin leaped the first—
Ah, Pussy, of the Sand,
The Hopes so juicy ripening—
You almost bathed your Tongue—
When Bliss disclosed a hundred Toes—
And fled with every one—
(Johnson 246).
The “voice” in the poem, the speaker who observes the cat stalking the robin, assigns
little judgment to the cat hunting a bird. A sense of detachment pervades the poem, and
enclosed in this almost scientific observation is a cool irony, a slight familiarity on the
part of the speaker with the cat. As a reader, we can almost see the saliva on the jaw of
the cat—we are hungry, too—hungry for not only food, but for the thrill of the catch that
this cat might experience when she pounces on a bird. We, too, can hardly stand the
suspense (“her teeth can hardly stand”) while waiting to see if the kill will take place. In
a sense, Dickinson here provides a “safe place” for repressed feminine desires to come to
the surface—instead of acting out her own angers, her own hungers, the speaker here
identifies this cat’s hunger as a feminine hunger, a feminine want (“She sights,” “Her
jaws,” etc).
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Humor in this piece emerges from the almost melodramatic suspense and inflated
qualities of the cat and ensuing scene: “The cat’s motions, while described realistically
enough to be immediately recognizable, exaggerate each of her movements so that
‘Pussy’ is cartoonlike, a figure that epitomizes hungry catness” (Juhasz 16). I feel that
the humor here serves two purposes. First, the speaker retains a sense of power despite
the cat’s failure; the poet has created a “coping mechanism” for dealing with “bliss” that
has “fled.” The act of recognizing and relating humorous aspects of a potentially tragic
scene or individual ultimately reflects the poet’s intelligence and maturity. Because
Dickinson creates a “shecat,” she draws a similarity between this cat’s hunger and
perhaps a “hunger” of females to express themselves in a primal manner. She creates a
scene in which the cat, despite effective stalking, loses its prey. The poem culminates in
the speaker offhandedly bemoaning the loss: “The poet here redescribes the event in
more abstract and metaphorical terms (‘The Hopes so juicy ripening … When Bliss
disclosed’), thereby making it a kind of parable of the failed attempt to gain a prize.
Rather than moralizing, however, Dickinson maintains the comic tone through her
continued exaggeration, and by animating Hopes and Bliss” (Juhasz 16). The poet’s use
of humor prevents despair—the speaker has not been overcome by anger; instead, she
retains the ability to laugh at herself, her hopes, and her “near Bliss.”
Secondly, I believe the humor as it specifically relates to animals in this poem
allows the speaker to attain certain closeness with her natural surroundings that may have
been impossible using a more tragic or somber tone. As Jonathan Bate proposes in his
essay “Poets, Apes and Other Animals,” the genre of humor may create a more direct
access into the natural environment than tragic genres: “The tragic hero somehow goes
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beyond the material world, rises to a plane of spiritual reconciliation. Comedy, on the
other hand, is about survival. It grants us our animal being, relishes the materiality of the
everyday world, concerns itself with the business of living and reproducing” (Bate 180).
Poem # 507 seems to adhere to this proposal. Lamentation in this poem would
necessarily include a “human” intervention and “occupation” of the scene, a serious
human ordering of the scene as he/she understands or wants it to be. Although there is a
sense of “ordering” in this comedic description, namely in that Dickinson identifies the
cat as a she and the desire as feminine, the comedy prevents any inflation or troubling
corruption of the scene. Ultimately, the cat is allowed to “be”; our human laughter at the
scene is purely laughter—we are not imposing our laugh at the expense of the cat or of
nature. The scene is hearty and enjoyable and creates an immediate physical connection
without heavy mental or emotional overtones: “Animals make us think about our own
animalness, about our embodiedness in the world” (Bate 187).
Dickinson’s humor is what sets her apart most blatantly from Emerson and other
traditional Romantics and establishes her intent as “nonoccupational.” She does not tend
to look at nature and its creatures solely to “acknowledge” or improve “the self” (Bate
188) but in order to establish a more holistic comprehension of her environment. Rather
than setting up a subject/object dichotomy in Poem #507, Dickinson glories in the
“object,” describing the cat’s physical and emotional desires in full. The implicit
connection between the cat’s qualities and a human’s qualities is open to a reader’s
interpretation. Dickinson does not claim any direct space for what the cat is showing the
subject or subject the reader to a writer’s authority over the scene. Rather, she lightly
uses biblical diction (“sand”) and its associated symbolism to illustrate how the pursuit of
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this cat might be compared to a human’s pursuit of material desires. Yet she refuses to
pass final judgment on either the cat or, associatively, on humans: “(Dickinson) smirks at
the mythic and the sacred, deflating pretentious characterizations of poets’ endeavors”
(Juhasz 19). Dickinson’s poem # 507 and others reflect an emerging awareness of how a
poet might engage a scene; her light touch reflects her desire to “see” and contemplate
natural surroundings without a politic of reclamation.
Many contemporary critics are beginning to examine Dickinson’s use of humor,
jokes, and comedy in poetry as it relates to a refutation of Romantic tendencies as well as
a feminist project. I hope to offer an extended argument regarding Dickinson’s use of
comedy as it relates to ecocriticism. Dickinson’s humor might provide not only a more
immediate connection with natural landscapes and animals for her readers, but the use of
humor in these “animal” or “natural” poems seems to serve a subversive purpose as it re
examines the relationship that man has to the natural world. In the case of Poem #507,
the identification of woman with cat creates a sympathetic relationship between female
and animal, perhaps a shared self deprecating “joke” that a woman can share with a cat.
This female speaker has the ability to laugh at herself and her own abstracted desires and
wants as she also giggles at a cat hunting in vain. Selfdeprecation is a strong source of
humor for Dickinson as well as a source of power as it brings analysis and experience to
a physical, even shared level. In a poem such as #507, the speaker laughs at the cat as if
she is laughing at herself. In this subtle mockery of physical desire, Dickinson’s poem
highlights momentary energetic instances and does not impose a plan or scheme for the
natural. Again, she refuses to assign flighty abstract qualities to the natural world or to
master some ultimate meaning that nature holds in store for her; instead, she remains
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grounded in the here and now: “Many may contend that, like the Puritans and
metaphysicals before her, Dickinson pulls the sublime down to the ridiculous but
unavoidable facts of existence, thus imbues life on earth with its real import” (Nell Smith
95). Dickinson’s insistence on physical immediacy, as detailed in poem #507, relates
directly to her aesthetic and poetic form. The poems as a whole refuse closed readings,
overarching themes, and progressive relationships although she uses the seemingly
straightforward form of the ballad hymn. Because the poems themselves do not
encourage singular readings, Dickinson’s aesthetic adheres to certain holistic or “open”
principles not encouraged by Western literary tradition (at that time): “Dickinson’s comic
verse lacks closure and depends more on the process of saying something than on
reaching a singular and definite conclusion. The pleasure of these texts is disruptive, de
stabilizing instead of reassuring. While her comedy may be ultimately redemptive, it is
only to the reader or audience who can accept her levels of isolation and difference”
(Juhasz, Miller, Smith 10).
When understood as a subversive tool, Dickinson’s humor becomes highly
effective and resonant. In poem #507, the humor subtly mocks the human tendency
towards a tragic inflation of natural landscapes; the poem also implicates its own speaker
in selfaggrandizement and laughs quietly at itself. In poem #861, “Split the Lark—and
you’ll find the Music,” Dickinson again utilizes mockery and teasing; however, in this
poem, the implication and criticism is directed at a “you”:
Split the Lark—and you’ll find the Music—
Bulb after Bulb, in Silver rolled—
Scantily dealt to the Summer Morning
Saved for your Ear when Lutes be old.
Loose the Flood—you shall find it patent—
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Gush after Gush, reserved for you—
Scarlet Experiment! Sceptic Thomas!
Now, do you doubt that your Bird was true?
(Johnson 412).

This poem criticizes Cartesian philosophy while situating it within a Christian system, so
that the criticism indicts religion as well as reason. Moreover, the poem directly
references the lark, a Romantic icon, and then literally dissects this icon. The setup is
again comic—the speaker adheres to a partsandwhole contemplation of the natural
world, but the subversive criticism emerges in the exaggerations of the poem. The first
line, “Split the Lark,” implies that a “you” must conduct violence on the bird in order to
understand its interworkings, i.e., where its music comes from. This opening is both a
mockery of Cartesian philosophy (as if one could understand the origin of birdsong by
dissecting a lark) and a disturbing representation of reason’s application—here, the result
is violence as well as a certain loss of humanism and compassion. The rest of the first
stanza adheres to the comic exaggeration, playing with the reader’s own belief systems as
its line of reasoning adheres to classic representations. The lark’s music is inside its
throat in this poem—rolled delicately in silver bulbs—and it can be preserved for the
future. In this case, the human “you” can dissect a bird’s throat, find its music, and save
it for a time “when Lutes be old.” The human has trespassed on the natural and changed
it permanently for its own benefit; nature in this first stanza has become completely
objectified. Yet the language at this point is still soft, lovely, and nonthreatening:
(“Scantily dealt to the Summer Morning”).
The second stanza parallels the first in structure and semantics (“Loose the
Flood—you shall find it patent—”). If we create a relationship between “Split” and
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“Loose,” then the word “loose” (to loosen) gains violent tendencies. “Loosing” a flood is
also unnatural; in this context the verb also implies a sense of a human trespass onto
natural structures and processes. Then, “you shall find it patent” must be compared with
“you’ll find the music” from the first line. (I believe the word “patent” acts as an
adjective meaning ‘free,’ ‘unobstructed,’ or ‘evident’). The structural turn here is
interesting—in the first line, the “you” will simply find Music, that is, the “you” will find
an object. In the first line of the second stanza, the “you” shall find “it,” an indefinite
article described by the adjective “patent.” If the word “it” refers to Flood, then the
speaker glories in his objectification of nature, finds it exhilarating to be surrounded by
openness and water. Yet if the word “it” subtly makes connection back to the first line of
the poem, and we draw a connection between “Music” and “it,” then some type of
“music” is contained within a flood the same as within a lark. And loosing this music us
ultimately destructive, as it sweeps the “you” under: “Gush after Gush, reserved for you.”
In this reading, much as the “you” desires to harness and preserve the lark’s music for a
time when “Lutes are old,” so the “you” assumes in the second stanza that the Earth’s
waters can be tamed by humanity. Moreover, the Christian implications of the “flood”
cannot be ignored—I believe in this poem that Dickinson draws attention to the Western
tendency to understand natural events (floods) purely in their metaphysical implications,
the tendency to experience the world from an abstract viewpoint. Yet the primary use of
the “Flood” in this poem seems to be to call attention to how man’s troubles rise and rise
the more he attempts to fashion the world according to his own terms. Indeed, the
implicit connection between the word “flood” and “blood” as a result of their buried
rhyme also implies the violent nature of these attempts. In the third line of the second
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stanza, we learn the identity of this fulsome “you”—he is a “Sceptic Thomas.” With this
understanding, we grasp the fact that the “you” conducts these “Scarlet Experiments” on
nature in order to “believe” in God. This fascinating twist at the end of the poem
illustrates the danger and shortcomings of Christianity because of its ties to Cartesian
rationale and experimentation. “God” and “nature” cannot be dissected for solely human
purposes—the result is ultimately violence as symbolized by “Scarlet Experiment.”
Then, in the final line of the poem: “Now, do you doubt your Bird was true?” the speaker
enters the poem directly and addresses the Sceptic Thomas—hoping that he understands
the damage he has wrought on natural landscapes, and, ultimately, on himself. The
phrase “your Bird was true” seems to imply that the Bird was better left alone to its own
devices—that tampering with nature leads to disastrous consequences for humans and
nonhumans. Furthermore, by likening “truth” to a “Bird” while referencing Thomas’s
biblical doubt, Dickinson emphasizes how the natural must participate in any discussion
of spirituality or religion.
Exaggeration comprises the principal method of humor in this poem—the speaker
creates a figurative situation along a Cartestian line of thinking and plays it out to a bitter
end. This exaggerated situation subverts classical lines of thinking; in this case, the
events display how a rational approach to the natural world becomes misdirected and
potentially harmful. The humor acts to subvert a conventional, patriarchal way of
thought and action. When contemporary readers and critics understand how Dickinson
utilizes humor in this fashion as a reactive and critical tool, many of the poems open
themselves up to extended interpretation. Furthermore, Dickinson’s use of humor to
discuss and analyze shortcomings in her surrounding culture and community
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demonstrates the local and even global awareness that she possessed while writing and
disproves any attempt to cage her poems solely within the personal realm. Most notably,
the presence of humor in Dickinson’s poetry indicates a need for an audience as well as
an understanding of how an audience should function. The performative element in these
poems proves their worldliness and concern with cultural topics at large; these poems are
not concerned only with themselves, but conduct an ongoing relationship to the world
around them:
To appreciate the full range of Dickinson’s humor, one must be able to
conceive of her as a sharp critic of her world, as a selfconscious writer
identifying with women’s experience as a basis for social criticism, and as
a crafter of multiple levels of intention in her poems. In contrast, to the
extent that one envisions this poet as unconscious of her self and her craft,
or as a victim suffering under patriarchy generally, or her own neuroses,
one will not find humor in her poems … the reader must both understand
the subversive intention as possible (that is, be already familiar with it)
and simultaneously accept a subversive intention as likely for the
speaker—in this case, recognize the personal and cultural clues that such
subversion is possible for a nineteenthcentury woman writer. (Smith,
Juhasz, Miller 1011)
In this understanding, Dickinson’s humor is emergent in time; whereas in the nineteenth
century a reading audience may have refused to discuss or witness Dickinson’s humor
because of the cultural implications, within a twentiethcentury perspective increased
allowances have been made for feminist readings: “Assumptions about femininity and
female characteristics and what pleases, provokes, disappoints, satisfies, satiates, entices,
disturbs, offends, or upsets women may prejudice readers so that women’s ironic and
humorous expressions are misconstrued as genuinely plaintive or earnest, or repudiated
as overbearing” (Smith, Juhasz, Miller 11). Furthermore, within the emergent discourse
contained in Dickinson’s poetry is an ecocritical project closely related to her feminist
one. She continues to utilize tools of parody, exaggeration, and selfdeprecation in order
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to criticize Western culture’s relationship to the natural world, and within this endeavor
are parallels to how she critiques Western patriarchies as a whole. Dickinson, arguably a
forerunner to literary modernism, seems to evince an understanding that patriarchy
objectifies and subdues women as well as nonhuman beings to a male will.
It is hardly surprising that recent interaction with Dickinson’s project includes an
ecocritical component within ongoing feminist analysis. Postmodernists and radical
feminists have articulated that a work of art or literature must change and be changed by
its readership; this fluid quality then demonstrates that the work subsists beyond
conventional hierarchies of author and reader. Dickinson, in her insistence on non
singular semantics and “openness,” understood the reader’s participation as necessary:
“Dickinson, in her poetic project, urges us beyond simple hierarchies between author and
reader, and, in doing so, beyond conventional hierarchies that organize the world”
(Smith, Juhasz, Miller 12). Ultimately, Dickinson’s work is feminist because it stresses
its own willingness to change: “Jonathan Culler notes a pertinent paradox: ‘The more a
theory stresses the reader’s freedom, control, and constitutive activity, the more likely it
is to lead to stories of dramatic encounters and surprises which portray reading as a
process of discovery.’ ” (Smith, Juhasz, Miller 13). Within a feminist theoretical
framework, a reader may laugh at Dickinson’s poems more strongly and appreciatively;
accordingly, with an increased awareness of androcentric tendencies in literature and
culture, a reader may begin to laugh at or appreciate Dickinson’s humor as regards non
human creatures and natural landscapes as well. The presence of humor in Dickinson’s
work illustrates her position not as an individual living a solitary life in a white dress,
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whiling away her time in a garden or bedroom, but as an intelligent and active civic
participant and an astute writer and composer.
A poem that illustrates “emergent humor” within a contemporary context is Poem
#842, “Good to hide, and hear ‘em hunt!” This poem utilizes a specific human to non
human relationship as a metaphor and also employs teasing as a comedic element:
Good to hide, and hear ‘em hunt!
Better, to be found,
If one care to, that is,
The Fox fits the Hound—
Good to know, and not tell,
Best, to know and tell,
Can one find the rare Ear
Not too dull—
(Johnson 406).

In this poem, Dickinson again metaphorically draws a connection between animals and
humans; she makes her most direct comparison between the speaker and the Fox. The
poem details a “hunt,” but draws attention to the particular strangeness of this specific
chase. Specifically, the poem makes space for a more conciliatory, reciprocal hunt, in
which both parties “win,” namely, it appears that this metaphorical fox wishes to be
found. Furthermore, because the metaphor changes at the finale—an “Ear” emerges—the
finding or chase culminates in the act of listening. What makes the metaphor ultimately
odd is the fact that the symbols seem to change places. Whereas at the beginning, the
speaker claims that it may be better for the Fox to be “found,” at the end, the pleasure or
satisfaction from the hunt results from the “Ear.” The fox, seemingly a metaphorical
standin for the poet at the beginning of the poem, wants to be found. Yet it is the hunter
who finds the Ear—not the fox—right? Or is it the fox? If the fox thinks it is better to be
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found, then it could be this animal who “finds” the rare ear to listen to it. Either reading
requires that the metaphor change in some way—either the metaphor for the speaker/poet
changes from the one being hunted into the hunter, or the one being hunted (the fox) is
also hunting as well—for the “rare Ear.”
The tease in the poem results from the riddlelike language and “code” that
pervades it (good, better, best), and perhaps Dickinson again employs these riddles in
order to examine and upend the traditional Romantic sense of metaphor and symbolism:
“A striking phenomenon in literary history is the degree to which English writers,
collaterally with their German contemporaries, imported such societal terms as “conflict,”
“mastery, “tyranny,” “submission,” “slavery,” “equality” and “freedom” into the
cognitive realm, to represent the relations between the mind and the natural world, or
between the mind and the physical senses, in the act of redemption” (Abrams
Supernaturalism 363). Dickinson does not use any of these words in this poem, but she
details the state of “freedom” in a strange and conditioned manner, making direct
comparison to a poet’s potential freedom that may be achieved through audience (finding
an “Ear” that is not too “dull” or unlearned). But this freedom remains inaccessible for
the speaker, betraying the insufficiency of the dualistic metaphor on which it relies. If
the fox does not make a sound, it will find freedom from the hunter. But what if the fox
symbolizes a poet, wishing to be heard by those hunters seeking out an original, talented
voice? What are the consequences of allowing the hunt to take place, of letting oneself
be “hunted?” In my mind, the metaphor emerges as deliberately multivalenced and
unfixed. Therefore, the Romantic condition that posits a condition of “slavery” opposite
one of “freedom” becomes incomplete for Dickinson: “Whatever approach readers take
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to her work, the significance of those textual realities must be taken into account: the
special experience of reading the Dickinson canon that produces in the reader no overall
order of the poet’s perception … the generic elements her poetry lacks, including titles,
selections and categorizations, magnitude, finishedness, a dialogue with history, a
hierarchy of claims, an ars poetica, and technical development” (Porter 21).
Feminist critics relate this quality of incompleteness, whether evinced in unstable
metaphors or lack of titles, as evidence of her willingness to challenge the dominant male
literary experience. Furthermore, the fact that this particular poem displays the act of
hunting and being hunted as so mutable demonstrates Dickinson’s unwillingness to make
assumptions regarding existing power systems, especially those that posit a human over
animal. In some sense, the speaker of this poem is aligned with the fox. Yet the odd
ludicrousness of a statement like “The Fox fits the Hound” compels a contemporary
reader to look in and around the basic premise of the metaphor: “When a power
relationship is inferred—between beloved and lover, between death and the living,
between the speaker and audience—Dickinson will experience both the danger and the
attraction of the situation. Into the breach between hiding and being found she will send
a teasing speaker … tease makes it possible for her to challenge these powers” (Juhasz
40). Several nuances of interpretation result from this riddle involving the hunted (and
hunting?) fox: first, Dickinson is admitting the pleasure in being hunted, even in being
captured. If one cares to be captured, it can lead to satisfaction “the Fox fits.” The one
being pursued (the poet) may have more in common with his/her hunter (a literary
audience) than at first glance. Or, a second possibility for interpretation results when we
understand this poem entirely as a joke—a satire, even. How can a Fox ever “fit” a
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Hound? How can being hunted ever be pleasurable? Why use the metaphor of the hunt
to explain how much a speaker wants an “Ear?” Dickinson may again be playing out her
joke to its bitter end, much as in Poem #862, “Split the Lark.” In this reading, a vein of
underlying violence emerges in the second stanza. If it is “good” to know, but not tell, it
becomes better to know and tell—as if the hiding in the first stanza were a type of
“knowing.” And, again, if this is an extended satirical representation of a hunt, than the
implied consequence of the final two lines amidst the riddling is the skinning of a fox’s
ear, using a sharp knife (“Not too dull”).
Poem #842 remains open to suggestion regarding its semantics and riddles, a
quality that Cristanne Miller believes is prevalent in many of Dickinson’s poems:
In poem after poem, this poet brings herself to the very point of going too
far, losing control—whether of good taste, metaphorical coherence, tone,
language more generally, or of narrative scene. Through the very
exuberance or weirdness of her expression in such poems, Dickinson
creates moments of linguistic and narrative incongruity, disruption, chaos;
yet because these same poems ultimately exult in … the poet’s power of
expression—hence, the power of the human psyche and brain—they are
humorous rather than merely frightening. (Miller 102)

The result of these frequent incongruities in the poem “Good to hide, and hear ‘em hunt”
permits increased audience participation and also emphasizes that no singular mode of
interaction should dominate over another among human to nonhuman relationships. At
times, it is good to hide, and remain hiding. At times, it is better to be found. Yet the
pressure we as readers must place on the words “Fox” and “Hound” or “Ear” and “Dull”
to actually make them “fit” may betray the poet’s inclination to sympathize with the
creature being hunted, rather then with the trained hound and man holding the leash. If
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such intense pressure is required in order to make the hunt “workable” in this poem, then
perhaps the poet means to show that any hunt is, ultimately, unworkable.
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Chapter 4: In Conclusion: Animating an EcoText
Despite the multivalenced semantics, codes, and riddles in her poetry, Dickinson
still expresses a hope for romantic transcendence or understanding, as Poem # 1129,
“Tell all the Truth but Tell it Slant,” implies:
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant—
Success in Circuit lies
Too bright for our infirm Delight
The Truth’s superb surprise
As Lightning to the Children eased
With explanation kind
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind—
(Johnson 5067).

The “natural” element of lightning in this poem functions as an example of a “truth” that
must be explained “gradually” to children, presumably so as not to frighten or disturb the
children, who might not have the mental capacity to understand the devastating power of
nature and death. The speaker in poem #1129 recognizes the necessity for “altering”
truth (and death); indeed, the poem hints at a belief that no mere human can ever
comprehend allpervasive, “Godly” truth: “Too bright for our infirm delight/ The Truth’s
supreme surprise.” The speaker condemns men and women who might claim knowledge
of the afterlife or otherworld—no human can understand and explain qualities of nature
and “spirit,” much as children must be protected from lightning, so adults must be
protected from “truth.” Yet although this poem articulates a human’s inability to
comprehend existence or the afterlife and would doubtless denounce religion’s
appropriations of “heaven” or “hell,” the speaker still emphasizes truth as if truth does
exist, somewhere, someplace: “In its lyric intimacy with power, melancholy, love, death,
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and infinite futurity—in all these we discern the lineaments of the culture from which it
stemmed … Her poems are the subtlest and most profoundly rooted flower of provincial
American life in its most coherent and successful form” (Chase 23). So if we remain
grounded in contextual reality, what space can we claim, theoretically, for Dickinson’s
interrogations of theology and spirituality that draw expressively and symbolically on
animals and nature? In what ways do Dickinson’s depictions of animals and the natural
world enact reformulations of tradition and how can we articulate her project?
Drawing on contemporary theoretical initiatives such as deep ecology and
ecofeminism, we understand that a human domination of the natural world is profoundly
rooted in hierarchy and androcentric cultural practices. Most notably, the capitalist
economic system that has grown to become a global system in the twentieth century has
caused perhaps the most significant environmental destructions such as water and air
pollution and a devastatingly high number of extinctions. Arguably, capitalism evolved
out of an emphasis on individualism, which in turn originated in Enlightenment
philosophy. “Cartesian” philosophy articulates a division between a man’s body and a
man’s soul (or intellect, or reason) and place primacy on the soul; yet Cartesian thought
also denies any other living creature the ability to possess a “soul.” Rooted in Western
culture, philosophy, and politics is a shared “understanding” that man dwells on a level
“closest” to God and therefore may subjugate all other species. This emphasis on
individualism led thinkers and policy makers to glorify the pursuit of individual means to
certain ends—specifically, man has a “right” to pursue property, liberty, happiness, etc—
and rationalized any damage or destruction that man might cause to other creatures or the
environment in these pursuits. A dualist mindset (or, in other words, the perceived divide
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between body and soul), openly relates to the twentiethcentury development of wide
reaching global capitalism and, as a result, increased environmental destruction.
Moreover, the history of sexism and racism can also be directly linked to Cartesian belief
systems. For centuries, Western philosophy and culture did not allow equal participation
in its society or theology for women and men, whites and nonwhites; these conceptions
are rooted in JudeoChristian tradition: “We are told that nonhuman animals were created
by God to be helpers or companions to Adam, and when they were seen as unfit, Eve was
created to fulfill this role” (Kheel 247). These dominant paradigms “othered” women
and nonwhites as easily as it “othered” or objectified nature en route to man’s increased
satisfaction and power.
Because women and nature share the experience of repression, it is necessary to
recognize that the relationship of woman to nature will ultimately differ from the
relationship of man to nature. As I noted through several close readings of Dickinson’s
poems, she tends to identify with animals, long for their physical experiences, and even
call certain animals “brother.” I believe that as a female writer, Dickinson had more
room to contemplate a different, highly personal relationship to animals and nature, and
in this process, she also exposes the limited and closeminded qualities of a hierarchical
conception of the natural. In the introduction to Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, and
Nature, Greta Gaard claims that a woman’s comprehension of the natural world tends to
lack objectification. Yet she stresses that this difference is not essentialist or biologically
determined, but rather culturally mediated: “A sense of self as separate is more common
in men, while an interconnected sense of self is more common in women. These
conceptions of self are also the foundation of for two different ethical systems: the

 61 

separate self often operates on the basis of an ethic of rights or justice, while the
interconnected self makes moral decisions on the basis of an ethic of responsibilities or
care” (2). Ultimately, Dickinson’s depiction of animals and nature in her poems
demonstrates this interconnectedness as well as this responsibility—and it is especially
interesting to consider how or why her “interconnected” self may have thrived through a
life spent in near isolation. Presumably Dickinson recognized the limitations of a dualist,
patriarchal view; through her articulations of ethics and care regarding animals in her
poems, she provides a more holistic, ultimately triumphant, comprehension of existence.
Moreover, her depictions and articulations of existing practices and systems are often
biting, satirical refutations of patriarchies and expose the violence imbedded in subject
object systems.
I believe that poem # 754, “My Life had stood—a Loaded Gun” is a fascinating
exploration and exposé of a traditional, patriarchal view of nature and ultimately
condemns the prevailing dualist conceptions:
My Life had stood—a Loaded Gun
In Corners—till a Day
The Owner passed—identified—
and carried Me away—
And now We roam in Sovereign Woods—
and now We hunt the Doe—
And every time I speak for Him—
The Mountains straight reply—
And do I smile, such cordial light
Upon the Valley glow—
It is as a Vesuvian face
Had let its pleasure through—
And when at Night—Our good Day done—
I guard my Master’s Head
‘Tis better than the EiderDucks’s
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Deep Pillow—to have shared—
To foe of His—I’m deadly foe—
None stir the second time—
On whom I lay a Yellow Eye—
Or an emphatic Thumb—
Though I than He—may longer live
He longer must—than I—
For I have but the power to kill,
Without—the power to die—
(Johnson 36970)
Poem #754 is a complicated rendering of a female speaker’s gendered relationship with a
Master, or God. The speaker experiences the masculine sublime, but she loses individual
power as a result of the experience, as outlined by Yaeger as a condition of a “failed
sublime”: “A woman’s sovereignty (is) her capacious seizure of what she desires. (a
man) takes this sovereignty away, revealing, in the process, the social forces that conspire
against a female sublime” (Yaeger 202). The opening phrase, “My Life had stood—a
Loaded Gun” implies that the speaker spent much of her life metaphorically standing still
although she had the capability and power to join in a “hunt”; her gun was set and loaded,
she simply needed to find a place to use it. When the male “Owner” arrives, the speaker
can leave the isolated place and presumably “use” her gun. What does this “Owner”
own? Does he own the speaker’s life? Does he own her gun? I think a connection can
be made between the “gun” and Dickinson’s poetic ability—she had nowhere to “fire”
the gun, nowhere to hunt, until the male “owner” of words and rhetoric came by to “pick
her up.”
And now, the female speaker can participate fully in the world of words—and
how brilliant a metaphor of the gun and the hunt to describe Dickinson’s “female”
feelings and sentiments at this point. To be accepted by male literary society, the female
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poet must participate in violence; she must conduct “hunts” and separate herself from
nature. This is no longer a place where a spider can be called “brother,” instead, the
speaker and “Owner” roam a “sovereign” wood, a separate place that can be entered,
consumed, and conquered—a place where they hunt and kill a female deer. And in
Dickinsonian style, there is some pleasure in this acceptance, in this ride with the Master:
“I guard My Master’s Head/‘Tis better than the Eider Duck’s/Deep Pillow—to have
shared.” The female speaker is sleeping with her master, “guarding” his head—and,
seemingly, her lap has taken the place of the Eider’s Duck’s deep pillow. This subtle
indication of how a female provides pillow and comfort to the male hunter just as the
duck’s feathers can also provide ease intimates that the female has to “die” or become
objectified just as the duck in order to enter the male personal space—there is, ultimately,
no equality between male and female, which the speaker will dryly hint at through the
sensual pleasure. And, furthermore, by joining with the male Master on this hypothetical
journey into the male sphere, the female is finally left with a loss: “Though I than He—
may longer live/He longer must—than I –/For I have but the power to kill,/Without the
power to die.”
I believe this final stanza refers to the autonomy that the female speaker had to
give up when she joined the patriarchal hunt. In some sense, the speaker is again
laughing at herself—but this is a dark humor beset by bitterness. The speaker seems to
say, “Yes, this is what I thought I wanted—but how wrong I was.” Yes, by assuming
male traditions, by internalizing the hierarchy, she has gained power—she can hunt and
kill the doe, she can hear and see Mountains and Valleys in new ways, she can enjoy
companionship of the Master—yet she has lost the “power to die.” This phrase, “to die,”
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I believe, refers to the fact that her body is no longer her own. The male Owner owns all
of her—owns her body and her life—she cannot be relieved of him at the moment of
death—all of her existence, including the way in which she wants to comprehend and
understand the afterlife, now belongs to him. When she adhered to the rules of the Hunt
and the Gun, she also signs her spirituality away—her death is no longer her own: “What
it means to be inside or outside another identity; what it means to ‘take in’ or possess; the
very meaning of boundary—are put into question by ‘My Life had stood—a Loaded
Gun—’ … ‘the other’ recognizes no boundaries, extending his presence into and through
herself, where the self’s physical processes, such as breath and pain, assume a male
identity” (Loeffelholz 83). Furthermore, specifically, in this “maledominant” world,
which in some ways the speaker may have longed to enter, animals and landscapes are
entirely objectified and are put to use for man’s desires (meat, pillow, etc.). In this
extended satire of a patriarchal space, Dickinson portrays the inherent danger in
occupying a man’s “area,” and, indeed, of occupying a man’s intellectual pursuit. To be
accepted is to lose one’s feminine identity, to lose interconnectedness with nature, to lose
a plural comprehension of existence. The temptation of power and knowledge are not
worth the loss of female identity; gaining the ability to “kill” is not worth losing the
ability to “die.” Furthermore, Dickinson seems to ultimately question the necessity of
power. The female cannot “die” or, ultimately, “exist” while enacting the man’s power
display, demonstrating that the male power paradigm (the idea that all humans are
naturally competitive and individualistic) is false and inapplicable to all humankind: “If
Mankind is by nature autonomous, aggressive, and competitive (that is, ‘masculine’),
then psychological and physical coercion or hierarchical structures are necessary to
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manage conflict and maintain social order. Likewise, cooperative relationships, such as
those found among women or tribal cultures, are by definition unrealistic and utopian”
(Gaard 25).
Finally, from my particular perspective, the most fascinating quality of the poem
emerges because this violent refutation of power systems occurs within the formal
structure of the Romantic sublime. The “normative” speaker encounters an “other” in the
person of the Master, experiences trauma and agitation in the partnership, and then comes
to a new understanding. Yet the formula here does not satisfy or enlighten the subject—
in opposite, Dickinson reveals the inherent patriarchy of the model and its effects on the
female subject. If the female assumes the “speaking” romantic subjectivity, that her
“other” is the Master who actually works to subjugate her. In this setup, the interaction
with the “other” results in negative or terrifying transcendence—and as a reader we
understand the implications of assuming the romantic sublime for this female speaker. In
this way we comprehend that the romantic model does not hold all of the answers—and
Dickinson exposes the masculine hunter who seeks to “convert” her as machinelike and
cold. Might his desire to kill reflect an inability to confront his own mortality?
Another poem that emphasizes the inability of mankind to comprehend or dwell
in certain aspects of “the natural” is Poem # 1116, “There is another Loneliness:”
There is another Loneliness
That many die without—
Not want of friend occasions it
Or circumstance of Lot
But nature, sometimes, sometimes thought
And whoso it befall
Is richer than could be revealed
By mortal numeral—
(Johnson 502).
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In this poem, the speaker references a particular kind of loneliness that many humans do
not experience in their lifetimes. Societal influences, such as social circles or economic
circumstances, do not cause this loneliness. This is a more ethereal, subjective feeling
that can strike an individual by chance. In one reading, it appears the speaker indicates
that sometimes the feeling arises because of “nature,” and sometimes because of
“thought.” Yet the fluidity of the line (“But nature sometimes, sometimes thought”)
leads to a more complicated reading. The repetition of the word “sometimes” without a
line break makes the relationship between each “sometimes” stronger. Notably, it
compels the reader to draw a connection between the word “nature” and “thought,” as if
“nature” is doing the thinking. And if this “thinking” is related to a particular loneliness
that strikes certain individuals in rare instances, then presumably it may be “nature”
thinking through a person. The poem seems to reference moments of epiphany or sudden
awareness—as when one is walking down a street and suddenly is aware for a split
second of one’s actual existence. These strange occurrences are rarely articulated clearly
(even by artists), and the vague nature of the lines in the second stanza seems to correlate
to this awareness.
The poem is deliberately coy and outwardly plays with its dual intention. If we
read the poem in the former manner, sometimes nature causes a feeling of loneliness and
sometimes “thought” causes a feeling of loneliness. In this original reading, the tenses
match up clearly, and the ultimate meaning of the poem remains that loneliness is not
always negative—in this case, the person befallen by isolation is “richer” than could be
revealed by any “mortal numeral” or rational way of thinking and/or “being.” Yet this
reading does little to explicate or explore the energy behind the original loneliness or the
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implications of it. The second reading I proposed above, though strange and awkward in
its tense shift, accomplishes more in the sense that it hints at the distinct nature of
loneliness of “nature” or “thought.” Presumably, this loneliness is close to the ultimate
loneliness of death—and though it is terrifying to experience while alive, may leave an
individual “richer” for the experience. Within my particular ecocritical context, the fact
that “nature” can either cause an inexplicable loneliness or “speak” through and
communicate this loneliness to a person emphasizes Dickinson’s unwillingness to occupy
nature in an androcentric fashion. Instead of trying to understand or categorize the
loneliness that results from “nature,” Dickinson allows the loneliness to happen and
celebrates the richness of the experience. Instead of fearing nature and/or mortality and
attempting to subjugate it, Dickinson lets well enough alone.
If venturing near patriarchal literary circles destroyed Dickinson’s particular
relationship to nature and physicality, presumably entering into the maledominated
church caused like harm: “Patriarchal spirituality has been earthdisdaining rather than
earthhonoring” (Gaard 47). In Poem #324, “Some keep the Sabbath,” Dickinson
exhibits a simple, unadulterated, nearly childlike tone as she describes her more
unconventional way of keeping the Lord’s Day. The humor in this poem is not dark,
brooding, or biting as it was in “My Life Had Stood—A Loaded Gun.” Rather, the
humor is innocent and fun and the poem’s scope is “cooperative and utopian” (Gaard):
Some keep the Sabbath going to Church—
I keep it, staying at Home—
With a Bobolink for a Chorister—
And an Orchard, for a Dome—
Some keep the Sabbath in Surplice—
I just wear my wings—
And instead of tolling the Bell, for Church,
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Our little Sexton—sings.
God preaches, a noted Clergyman—
and the sermon is never long,
So instead of getting to Heaven, at last—
I’m going, all along.
(Johnson 1534).
The Clergyman, the Sexton—these traditionally male roles have been upended as
Dickinson assigns animals to the tasks. Instead of entering into an institution that would
force her into an objectification of nature and animals, she chooses to create her own
church, a small, harmonious, ethical place in which creatures can engage in shared
worship: “A failure to recognize connections can lead to violence, and a disconnected
sense of self is most assuredly at the root of the current ecological crisis (not to mention
being the root cause of all oppression, which is based on difference)” (Gaard 2). By
including animals in her church and elevating them to positions of influence, Dickinson
implies that her conception of “authority” or power differs greatly from the conventional
church. Again, as in “My Life had stood—A Loaded Gun—“ Dickinson exposes how
mainstream institutions (literature, religion) contain imbedded power systems that
disallow female (and animal) participation. In some sense Dickinson’s elevation of the
bobolinks and other birds to choristers and sextons might be conceived as satirical, that
“even animals” can occupy positions of power better than men. In this reading, the
“danger” from an ecofeminist perspective is that she objectifies or “uses” animals to
prove a point about men. Yet I believe that the speaker in this poem simply prefers the
company of animals entirely to that of men whose patriarchal systems cause
disengagement from nature and the female self. There is laughter, at the silliness of the
scene, but again the speaker’s laughter is directed as much at herself as at the animals that
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she “dresses” with words. The tone is kind (“Our little sexton—sings”), articulating a
hope for a different kind of religious community, one without withering sermons, more
direct and tangible. And although the speaker dresses her animals, she also adorns
herself with animal feathers: “I wear my wings”—and finds comfort here: “I’m going, all
along.”
Dickinson’s recourse to nature for a religious experience follows certain
Romantic prescriptions. Emerson, in particular, saw nature as suffuse with “soul”
insomuch as a man: “The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a
remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious”
(Emerson 73). Yet Dickinson’s attempt to experience religion via nature in this poem
differs from the grand, expressive gesture offered by Emerson or Wordsworth. The
emphasis on the solace of the domestic space (the house and backyard), rather than any
sweeping landscape or vista, evokes a direct contrast to her contemporaries: “So intimate
is this Unity, that, it is easily seen, it lies under the undermost garment of Nature, and
betrays its source in Universal Spirit. For it pervades Thought also. … I is like a great
circle on a sphere, comprising all possible circles, which, however, may be drawn and
comprise it in like manner” (Emerson 60). Much as the natural does not serve Dickinson
as a means to an end, it will not serve as a generalizing, overarching concept. Rather, it is
in the particular, discrete details of her home and yard that she finds spirituality, and she
ultimately remains in that space of domestic intercourse rather than move beyond it.
Many Romantic poets utilized animal and natural symbolism while describing
their increasingly charged relationship with God: “As many a scholarly study has shown,
the transition from a quasiinferential knowledge of God through nature to a more
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emotional communion with God in nature came quickly, spread widely, and lasted well
into the nineteenth century” (Perkins 39). And although Dickinson did not explicitly
claim a theological space for animals and landscapes, her metaphorical representation of
how an animal might participate in a spiritual endeavor as ardently as a human illustrates
her holistic, nonhierarchical conception of physical reality. By emphasizing this aspect
of her project, I hope to create a discursive relationship between Dickinson and the
emerging contemporary field of ecofeminism: “Ecofeminists have mounted a challenge
to this Patriarchal essentialism, or the idea that socalled ‘masculine’ traits are the essence
of human nature and that power structures are a necessary concomitant of human
Society” (Gaard 26). In her poems, Dickinson asks animals to help her to understand
God, to provide her with access to reach transcendence (wings, songs, etc). These
requests, though simple and direct, are heartfelt and rigorous. Dickinson’s poetic
allegiance and loyalty to animals came before any loyalty to patriarchal systems or
paradigms. When she satirizes in her poems, she is satirizing man; when she genuinely
laughs in the poems, an animal is likely close by. Her ultimate decision not to publish or
share much of her work may have resulted from an understanding of the implicit violence
in existing cultural systems; furthermore, because of her unconventional, irregular
audience, she may have felt “freer” in her poetic constructions of heaven and earth,
constructions that allowed birds, bees and spiders to become her brothers, sisters, peers,
and helpmates.
In her essay, The Power of Otherness: Animals in Women’s Fiction, Marian
Scholtmeijer explores the material possibilities for women fiction writers in regards to
animals and natural landscapes. How exactly do female authors attain the closeness to
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the natural world that can refute patriarchal conceptions of nature? What precise
techniques can women writers call upon in their depictions of community and partnership
with animals? Scholtmeijer places primacy on the ability and tendency of female writers
to “think” themselves into the condition of the other: “The political thrust of my
argument comes not from denial of the status of other for women and animals, but from
denial that ‘otherness’ presupposes weakness. … as women’s acknowledgement of
animals in fiction confirms, the radical otherness of nonhuman animals provides a double
source of power …In their work on animals, moreover, women writers perform that most
antiandrocentric of acts: thinking themselves into the being of the wholly ‘other,’ the
animal. It turns out that this is not an act of selfsacrifice but of empowerment”
(Scholtmeijer 233). Returning to poem # 324, “Some keep the Sabbath” with this
perspective in mind, I think the poem becomes not only a renunciation of conventional
representations of religion and spirituality, but also becomes an enactment of
Scholtmeijer’s theory of empowerment through the “other.” Identifying with birds is not
an optout from society; rather, the identification enacts a deliberate attempt to create
another “society” where all “others,” including women and animals, have time and space
for participation and action: “Establishing the legitimacy of outcast experiences is
precisely the political cultural work that needs to be carried out in real life for the sake of
all beings disenfranchised by sanctioned power systems” (Scholtmeijer 233).
As ecofeminists assert, the claim that humans are inherently individualistic,
competitive, and even violent is a purely patriarchal claim asserted by those who possess
power within the current system and wish to retain that power. Within a patriarchal
framework, man is often situated against nature, whether as a victim or conqueror. From
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this androcentric viewpoint, “nature” is constructed as a fearful, potentially devastating
aspect of reality that must be tamed and subdued in order for humans to realize progress
and independence. Ecofeminists reveal that these types of claims in no way reflect any
“naturalness” whatsoever in the physical world. “Nature” is as much a construction as
“Society”; our feelings and thoughts toward landscapes and nonhuman creatures are
determined by those who possess the most power within current patriarchal systems:
“The legacy of the history of male dominance, which I call the ‘androcentric premise,’ is
still evidenced in virtually all modern schools of thought, even ‘radical’ ones … it is an
interpretation of human nature that assumes the universality of a masculine model of Man
and its associated values” (Birkeland 24). As an extension of the naturalization of
masculinity, androcentrism also serves to rationalize competition and violence among
humans. If humankind is “by nature” individualistic and competitive, than any fighting
over resources or power is accepted as “a way of the world.” This implicit acceptance of
what comprises a “natural” human remains dangerous in a variety of forms, most notably
in the destruction wrought on the environment. However, ecofeminists assert that the
connection between gender and environmental devastation cannot be ignored. Until the
basic patriarchal premise is understood (and, perhaps, eradicated) in the cultural response
to and understanding of “nature,” then destruction, war, and extinction will continue:
“Ostensibly genderneutral theories protect the power structure by concealing the
ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, classism,
sexism, capitalism, and other pathological ‘isms’ of modernity obtain legitimacy from the
assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human Society due
to Man’s ‘inherent nature’” (Birkeland 25). Yet, if the patriarchal premise involved in
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our cultural apprehension of “nature” is completely removed, what remains? Do
constructivist modes of understanding simply make more room for other humanbased
ecological relationships to emerge (even if these are seemingly positive “communal”
relationships)? Should there be any “givens” in a representation of ecological reality?
What do these givens look like?
Taking note of these questions, it is still important to note that for the majority of
literary history as well as the present time, mainstream Western writers and thinkers often
continue to represent the mannature relationship as a dichotomous one. Therefore, much
of the work of ecofeminist literature must on the one hand expose erroneous Cartesian
conceptions and must also strive to assert how “utopian” structures such as cooperative
relationships and communities might be more rewarding and beneficial for humans and
animals alike. In terms of animal relationships, women writers often follow guidelines
for ecofeminist literature as outlined by Scholtmeijer. They might confront the
separation of human and animal that rationalizes victimization: “Women can subvert the
assumptions on which victimization is founded through allegiance with animals”
(Scholtmeijer 235); or, as an extension, a woman writer might confront “cultural
suppositions about the state of the individual as a subject” (Scholtmeijer 235). Finally, a
woman writer might enact a metaphorical or symbolic animal community: “These
fantasies show the way out of opting out of dominant culture and joining up with the
animals, who already occupy worlds apart from ours” (Scholtmeijer 235). Although
Dickinson most certainly associates being victimized with animals and challenges the
isolation between human and animal via her constructions of a dynamic animalhuman
community such as in the poem “Some keep the Sabbath,” I feel that her poetry follows
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one additional and important guideline for a more unconventional and compassionate
relationship to animals. Most of her poems that challenge traditional animal narratives
employ humor as she attempts to lend her nonhuman friends both an element of spirit as
well as grace. In the following pages, I will discuss how several of Dickinson’s poems
build on and extend Scholtmeijer’s conception of subversive animal narratives because of
how she (Dickinson) employs humorous techniques.
A poem that asserts a kinship between a victimized animal and a victimized
female speaker is # 165: “A Wounded Deer—leaps highest—:”
A Wounded Deer—leaps highest—
I’ve heard the Hunter tell—
‘Tis but the Ecstasy of death—
And then the Brake is still!
The Smitten Rock that gushes!
The trampled Steel that springs!
A Cheek is always redder
Just where the Hectic stings!
Mirth is the Mail of Anguish—
In which it Cautious Arm,
Lest anybody spy the blood
And “you’re hurt” exclaim!
(Johnson 7778).
The first stanza begins immediately with the image of an injured animal. The speaker
relays information from the mouth of a “Hunter,” someone who has seen a deer’s
behavior while under duress. The first stanza smacks of satire and this tone extends into
the second stanza as well. The speaker is communicating how the hunter rationalized the
deer’s behavior, seemingly putting a positive spin on how high the deer leapt after
receiving a fatal wound. The action of “Leaping high” is a seemingly joyous, celebratory
gesture, one that excites the Hunter and inflames his enjoyment of the chase and capture.
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Seemingly, the speaker is also “excited” throughout this first stanza, caught up in re
telling the story of the kill. Yet the language of the second stanza is deliberately
exaggerated and unrealistic. Like a wounded deer leaping high, a “smitten” rock gushes
and a “trampled” steel springs. By personifying these inanimate objects, the speaker
relays the ridiculousness of celebrating the deer’s leap as something “ecstatic.” There is
no comparison—the deer is suffering, likely symbolizing the speaker’s own pain.
The kinship between animal and woman in this poem arises because the speaker
implicates herself in the patriarchal “hunt” of the deer. She, too, is guilty—first for
“celebrating” the hunt, and secondly, for behaving in a manner like the deer when she too
is “wounded,” leaving herself open to patriarchal occupation. When the speaker ridicules
the Hunter’s perception of the “ecstatic” deer, she criticizes herself for also assigning
mystical qualities to the deer’s suffering—it was her pen that wrote “ecstasy of death,”
even though later she redacts this androcentric valuation of the scene in stanza two,
Moreover, stanza two reveals that the female speaker has been as hurt by patriarchy’s
linguistic assignations as the deer; indeed, perhaps the deer is a metaphorical standin for
her own selfconception as a victim: “A Cheek is always Redder/Just where the Hectic
stings!” Stanza three then emerges as the crux of the matter. If the speaker participates
in the “hunting” of the animal by listening and participating in conversation about it, she
also participates in the “hunt” for herself because she covers up her pain and suffering
with “words”—in this case, comic or humorous words: “Mirth is the Mail of Anguish/
In Which it Cautious Arm.” This is a multifaceted metaphor involving the deer—much
as the deer leaps upon being shot, so the speaker laughs when she is hurt. Both actions
result in the patriarchal “hunter” catching his prey. In the case of the deer, the animal’s
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life is lost. In the case of the speaker, she figuratively loses some aspect of her life as
well. Yet because the speaker is laughing in order to cover up her hurt (“Lest anybody
spy the blood / And ‘you’re hurt’ exclaim”) there is another comparison made between a
woman’s selfprotective behavior and a deer’s selfprotective “leap.” Much as an animal
in the wild will hide its pain in order not to be sought out by predators, so a woman must
shield herself from patriarchy’s “gun.”
Poem #165 emerges as a work that places a woman’s pain on par with an animal’s
pain, and the shared source of the pain emerges as the patriarchal hunter. Dickinson has
adhered to ecofeminist assertions that this type of progressive literature must expose
patriarchy’s conception of the “natural.” In this poem, patriarchy perceives the deer’s
leap as a momentous, ecstatic, adrenalinepumping leap before death—a hopeless last
leap that takes place before death befalls the animal. The speaker’s connection with this
type of animal pain allows the reader to comprehend that our conceptions of the “natural”
do not necessarily reflect reality. The speaker explains to us that she, too, is like the
animal—she covers up her pain and suffering through what others might perceive as
mirth—much as hunters misjudge the deer’s behavior. Furthermore, because we
understand that the speaker covers up her pain with laughter, we reread the first two
stanzas with the understanding that the speaker’s celebratory tone and inflated diction
actually work to mask her pain. So, this roundabout “code” leads us to realize that the
speaker’s “pain” results from the animal’s pain. If the speaker allows herself to laugh
and celebrate the “ecstasy” of the animal’s death, she is therefore laughing to over up her
other feelings. It is a lonely place for the speaker to end up in at the conclusion of this
poem, but critically this move places Dickinson within an ecofeminist framework: “The

 77 

narrative act of conjoining human and animal victims is a step toward affirming the
importance of animal suffering. At the same time, the psychic unity of woman and
animal victim underscores the pointed rejection of women from the social nexus”
(Scholtmeijer 236). Dickinson pairs up the lonely speaker with the animal victim and
renders a complicated expose of patriarchal “injury.” Dickinson’s utilization of humor in
her poetic execution proves invaluable and leaves the reader aware that a speaker’s
laughter remains entirely notable as well as revealing.
Another ecofeminist literary project as outlined by Scholtmeijer may allow an animal

to escape or may question the abuse of an animal; she offers an additional option for
ecofeminst writers to create “fantasy worlds” or communities in which animals and
humans coexist together. Dickinson’s poem #1561, “No Brigadier throughout the
Year,” does not depict outright physical abuse of an animal but does question the human
tendency to place animals on lower spiritual rungs of the celestial ladder; furthermore, it
creates a symbolic union between the human speaker and a bird, much to the dismay of a
“skygod” watching over the pair from above. The poem animates a bird with mighty
and almost royal characteristics, leading the reader to comprehend this creature’s sense of
agency and perhaps consciousness:
No Brigadier throughout the Year
So civic as the Jay—
A Neighbor and a Warrior too
With shrill felicity
Pursuing Winds that censure us
A February Day,
The Brother of the Universe
Was never blown away—
The Snow and he are intimate—
I’ve often seen them play
When Heaven looked upon us all
With such severity
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I felt apology were due
To an insulted sky
Whose pompous frown was Nutriment
To their temerity—
The Pillow of this daring Head
Is pungent Evergreens—
His Larder—terse and Militant—
Unknown—refreshing things—
His Character—a Tonic—
His Future—a Dispute
Unfair an Immortality
That leaves this Neighbor out—
(Johnson 649).
In this poem Dickinson creates a metaphorical “escape” for the Jay. The enacted
escape is more figurative than literal; by personifying the Jay and lending it human
qualities, Dickinson lets the animal break out of its traditional role in human dialogue and
experience. She opens the poem by simultaneously calling the bird a civic brigadier, a
neighbor, and a warrior. In this description, the speaker is distinctly absent—no “I” spots
and then comprehends the bird—this is a more unmediated approach, allowing the bird to
subsist on its own terms. The “I” has little to do with the fact that this Jay is a
“Neighbor” and “Warrior,” rather, these facts are relayed as “givens” in the landscape.
The speaker enters the poem informally with the line: “Pursuing Winds that censure us”
and then more formally at: “I’ve often seen them play.” The speaker’s role in this poem
is to observe and admire the Jay and how he contends with the bitter winter landscape
surrounding him. Much as Dickinson referred to animals in other poems as brother or
partner, here she also refers to the Jay as “the Brother of the Universe,” and she enjoys
watching her metaphorical sibling play with the Snow: “the Snow and he are intimate.”
The poem takes an interesting turn in the middle with the line: “When Heaven
looked upon us all / With such severity /.” Here, Dickinson animates “Heaven” as she

 79 

has previously animated the “Snow” and the “Jay.” She lends “Heaven” humanlike
qualities and situates it as a “character” within the poem. “Heaven” does not seem
pleased at what it sees below on Earth; likely, this displeasure is a result of the play
among the Jay, Snow, and the speaker. Although the speaker feels she ought apologize to
the mighty sky, as expressed in the line, “I felt apology were due,” she offers no contrite
gesture. Rather, the speaker reveals that the sky’s displeasure actually causes those being
watched to behave more and more impudently: “Whose pompous frown was Nutriment/
To their Temerity.” The speaker intimates that Heaven is portentous and, moreover,
wrong insofar as how it conceives of the speaker and her relationship to the Jay and the
Snow. Interestingly, this particular poem reflects little inner turmoil in regards to its
subtle rebellion against Heaven and convention. Similar to Letter #175, in which
Dickinson expressed concern that her father may have been subconsciously judging her
for her spiritual quandaries, in this poem the speaker recognizes that the “correct” or
conventional behavior would be to apologize to the great sky for her indiscretion.
However, the speaker intimates that more is at stake here than herself—she is
reconsidering and reformulating how Heaven and convention regard her figurative
brother, the Jay: “Unfair an Immortality/ That leaves this Neighbor out.” This poem
reflects anger and impatience as a direct result of how Heaven perceives of animal
spirituality. The speaker metaphorically refuses to alter her behavior and continues to
celebrate the Jay (and, accordingly, celebrate herself) through the end of the poem: “The
Pillow of this daring Head / Is pungent Evergreens/ His Larderterse and Militant/
Unknown—refreshing things.”
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Dickinson relies on humor to achieve her particular renunciation in poem #1561.
Her devices here rely on a light poetic touch, and although the voice does not explicitly
articulate itself as a child, there is a childlike daring and rebellious quality to the poem.
The characterization of “Heaven” as pompous and overbearing is similar to how a child
might sulkily characterize an authority figure. Through this “innocent” or “youthful”
voice, Dickinson achieves a safe space for criticizing a system that does not cherish or
emphasize creatures and landscapes as she might: “The perspective of ingenuousness in
Dickinson’s poetry is a tease from the word go, because it is a role assumed by an
educated, adult woman. It is a way to play at innocence, to imagine a condition beyond
he full constraints of culture, and then to use it as a position from which to critique the
culture” (Juhasz 29). Through her speaker’s metaphorical daring, Dickinson manages to
enact cultural subversion via poem # 1561. From the ecofeminist perspective, she has
managed through her language to celebrate an animal’s way of life on its own, without
human objectification or intervention. Yet the language of metaphorical “escape,”
however adamant, remains personified—she lends the Jay human qualities in order to
elicit sympathy for him and to create a fullbodied connection with him. This aspect of
the poem betrays how difficult ecofeminist poetics becomes at the level of language—
that in order to “free” the oppressed creature, a speaker must still relate to and describe
that creature using human language and experience. Yet the aim of an ecofeminist
project remains alteration and repair of man’s corrupted relationship with nature, and this
poem attempts to raise and question the objectifying tendencies of convention and
religion in regard to animals: “The question is how the massive abuse of power by
(specific groups of) humans can be stopped, their exploitation and destruction of the lives
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of others (human and nonhuman) and of the socalled environment, can be stopped”
(Kappeller 334).
When Dickinson emphasizes the majesty and might of nature, she typically points
out that these qualities subsist outside of human intervention. The Jay in poem #1561
appears in his “felicity” before the human speaker appears in the poem; his qualities
precede any human intervention in the scene. The aim of this poem to mock a religion
that makes no room for the bird’s “immortality” or spirit. Most clearly, Dickinson seems
to achieve a refutation of patriarchal religion by aligning herself with the “other.” This
alignment occurs clearly in “No Brigadier throughout the Year,” in which the speaker
aligns herself clearly with the Jay against “Heaven” and convention. As a result of the
animalhuman alliance in this poem and in many others outlined earlier, the separation
that must occur during the sublimation phase cannot happen as a result. Indeed, when we
read this poem within the “matrix” of the sublime, Dickinson’s frustration becomes
mightily apparent. If the beginning of the poem represents the “normative” phase in
which animal, landscape, and speaker all “play” together, then presumably the
“traumatic” phase occurs when Heaven espies them together and as a result the characters
gain more “temerity.” Yet there is little room within this structure for “sublimation.”
The speaker has grown more daring, and can learn “refreshing things” from the Jay, who
is presumably experiencing “trauma” as well. Because of the speaker’s established
alliance with the Jay, presumably the speaker and the Jay should emerge “triumphant” as
a result of the poem’s progress. But the Jay is left behind—he has no spirit. He is a
“Neighbor” but he is “left out.” We can also wonder if the romantic “structure” in this
poem situates “Heaven” as “other.” If this reading holds throughout the poem, then in
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this reading the “other” does little to affect the “normative” state of the speaker and her
Neighbor Jay, similar to how the Master as “other” negatively affects the speaker in “My
Life had Stood—a Loaded Gun.” The experience with the “other” is beguiling and
frustrating, and compels the characters to act abrasively out of frustration and anger.
Their experience with the “other” reminds them that in order to achieve sublimity on
these terms, the “neighbors” must separate and go their separate ways—one, presumably,
to Heaven and the other, to nowhere.
Therefore, Dickinson’s particular “sublime” must include the “others” whom she
works to hard to make into partners and friends throughout the poems. Although her
project is wholly related to and indebted to the Romantic model of heightened
subjectivity and secularization of “skygods,” she will not embrace this model in all its
untoward aspects. I believe, in conclusion, that her rather nebulous refutation of the full
Romantic endeavor must relate specifically to gender. The Romantic models of the
sublime and transcendence cannot serve a nineteenth century female writer in the same
way as they might serve a male writer: “Theoretically speaking, the nineteenth century
woman poet was barred, in the cultural myth of which Freud was only one later redactor,
from what Thomas Weiskel describes as the essential structure of the ‘sublime
movement,’ its recapitulations of the ‘positive resolution’ of the boy’s Oedipus complex.
In the ‘sublime moment,’ the individual ego conquers an awesome external threat by
identifying with a transcendent faculty that at once contains, interjects, and is contained
by … ‘Already castrated,’ as Freud would put it, she has no direct access to the initiatory
agon through which a male poet may assume his identification with patriarchal tradition”
(Loeffelholz 50). This preexisting castration emerges directly in those poems about
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animals and nature, poems in which Dickinson foregrounds the fact that the Romantic
model leaves little to no room for “alreadyothered” female poets. Because of this
condition of gender, Dickinson is left to condemn, parody, or fragment the Romantic
model in various poems: “Instead Dickinson seeks out the differences within male
language itself, the contradictions … and plays them out through skeptical quotation,
punning reference, and selfdeconstructing figures” (Loeffelholz 54).
Although Dickinson did not attempt to formulate an alternative model in her
search for personal “transcendence” and remained reliant upon the sublime experience in
general, her humor in particular demonstrates a willingness to confront the inadequacies
and sexist tendencies of the Romantic sublime. Many critics have claimed that her
project lacks “authorial control:” “The more credible charge (David) Porter brings against
Dickinson is that she fails to fulfill the vocational responsibilities of a serious author. His
litany of neglect reveals a clear and plainly factual difference between Dickinson’s
authorial practice and that of virtually all her peers and contemporaries” (Stonum 8). Yet
it is this very lack of “control” or “mastery” that feminist critics especially have
celebrated. Indeed, it is fascinating that the one American poet who did follow the
Romantic “prescription” for a life of artistic solitude did not communicate any wholly
formed thematic or aesthetic product out of this life spent in isolation. Theorists as a
result have argued that we must read Dickinson’s lack of “control” or guidance as
conscious and deliberate: “By transforming the space between the reader and the text,
Dickinson creates the conditions for a more dynamic and unstructured or open reading
experience. The text becomes a field for volatile appropriation in the most physical and
positive sense” (Juhasz, Miller, Smith 25). A reader can therefore positively appropriate
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the poem in an ecocritical or ecofeminist fashion, especially because of the humorous
tropes of ingenuousness, exaggeration, and satire, among others. Although Dickinson’s
mockery of convention most likely resulted from her frustration with certain Romantic
models, a contemporary reader can subsequently comprehend her project as possessing
ecocritical components. Her poetic “openness,” a product of her unwillingness to adhere
to tenets of Romantic “mastery,” allows for exciting, postponed understandings of the
work:
The Skies can’t keep their secret!
They tell it to the Hills—
The Hills just tell the Orchards—
And they—the Daffodils!
A Bird—by chance—that goes that way—
Soft overhears the whole—
If I should bribe the little Bird—
Who knows but she would tell?
I think I won’t—however—
It’s finer—not to know—
If Summer were an Axiom—
What sorcery had Snow?
So keep your secret—Father!
I would not—if I could,
Know what Sapphire Fellows, do,
In your newfashioned world!
(Johnson 90).
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